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31. Introduction
1.1. Chivalry and honour
Chivalry and honour, a direct link exists between them two. In chivalric mind only nobility 
could  be  truly  honourable  and  honour  became  one  of  the  primary  qualities  of  chivalry.  Still 
questions can be asked what them too are and both can have different meanings then they had in 
times  of  yore.  Chivalry is  often  used  as  a  synonym for  gracious  behaviour,  be  kind  and help 
someone, especially a woman and she might comment that chivalry isn't dead, reflecting the more 
romantic ideas of brave and noble knights with their shining armour and white horses. Still chivalry 
wasn't a romantic myth but rather something that can be seen as one of the central ideas of Middle  
Ages.  A person with minimal  knowledge of that  period can probably thing of knights,  castles, 
tournaments  and  crusades,  being  also  able  to  see  the  true  heart  of  chivalry,  but  perhaps  not 
recognize: the skill in arms and being warriors. In the end there are many views on knights and 
chivalry in the popular culture, some following the romantic ideal picture, others taking an opposite  
direction that is even more violent and warlike than the very actual chivalry was. Most of views 
from the popular culture consist of grains of truth, but rarely the whole picture.
What was chivalry then? Maurice Keen has defined chivalry has a code and culture of a 
martial estate that regarded war as a hereditary profession.1 This is perhaps the simplest and most 
condensed way of defining chivalry and culture around it.  The word chivalry itself comes from 
French  chevalierie,  which comes  chevalier  and has its origins in its  word for riding,  making a 
connection with chivalry and its origins and purpose in mounted combat. The origins of chivalry 
may have been modest, earlier mentions of terms  milites and  cnicht being more connected to a 
group of mounted warriors that were bound to their lords service. Over time their vocation became 
connected with nobility and aristocracy, becoming the knight and chivalric culture that is most seen 
when studying medieval history, Keen listing the time of its existence being roughly from twelfth to 
sixteenth century,2 from the time the “mounted warriors” became like knight and chivalry that its 
known for the rest of the Middle Ages and until the changes in warfare and perhaps culture in  
general ended its age. In all of this the connection between combat and chivalry can be clearly seen 
and indeed combat and war were the primary interest to the members of knighthood. Its not wrong 
1 Keen, Chivalry, 263
2 Ibid, 3
4to call chivalry a warrior culture and this leads to the matters of honour and dishonour.
The word honourable is often linked to good and decent behaviour, but its a concept than 
just  that  .  In  the  widely  used  words  of  anthropologist  Julian  Pitt-Rivers  honour  is  defined  as 
following: Honour is the value of a person in its own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is  
his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim,  
his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride.3 As such the concept of honour is strongly 
affected by society, which is considered acceptable or worthy in one might be seen as a shameful 
act in another. In Chivalric culture, honour held a central importance, reputation and recognition 
being an important part of nobleman's life. There were a number of social norms and ideals a knight 
was expected to follow to be respected all while avoiding shame, humiliation or loss of eyes in front 
of other members of nobility. The rest of knighthood served an important role in a knight's way to 
reputation  and  recognition,  because  the   main  word  about  which  actions  were  considered 
honourable or  shameful  were the knight's  peers.  In essence he both competed with the rest  of  
knighthood for honour and recognition, while they were also a source of them.4  This gives an 
unsurprising competitive view to chivalric culture, showing that by large the that reputation and 
recognition were the main drive for chivalry.
1.2. The subject and methodology
I have to admit that despite being interested in history and middle ages, the knights and 
chivalry weren't never among my preferred subjects and when younger I all too often found myself 
critical  towards  them,  mostly  seeing  them  in  their  arrogant,  foolhardy  and  honour-obsessed 
misconception, although the latter word or definition actually fits chivalry. Perhaps my earlier views 
and thoughts were the reason why I decided to write my thesis on matters of chivalry and honour, as 
they actually felt  something I  had held some distance from. Over  some time and planning the 
subject which had originally been “The Concept of Honour and Dishonour in the Chivalric Culture  
in the basis of the Hundred Years War chronicles ,“ found its focus in the first book of Froissart's 
chronicle and his descriptions of cases of capture and captivity, making them the way how I started 
discussing the nature of chivalric culture and its sense of honour. A lot is written and studied about 
chivalry,  Hundred  Years  War  (or  rather  Wars),  matters  of  honour  or  Froissart's  chronicle.  The 
purpose of my thesis is perhaps not to discover something new, it would be hard to do so, but rather 
3 Pitt-Rivers, Julian. Honour and social status. 24
4 Taylor, Chivalry and Ideals of Knighthood, 57
5study  and  discuss  chivalric  culture  and  the  importance  of  honour  in  it,  trying  to  offer  new 
viewpoints,  widen and deepen the discussion  about  the  subject  and perhaps  find some smaller 
details that may have been unseen before. As Keen, Kaueper and several other medieval historians 
have noted, despite the basis and major themes being well known and covered, there is still enough 
to be found and discussed to last for a few centuries.5 So I hope that my paper will be useful in 
continuing  and  advancing  the  discussions  about  chivalric  culture,  and  perhaps  serve  as  an 
inspiration and a stepping stone for some other works. In more local matters this thesis becomes 
valuable because as far as I now there are few papers written abut Western European chivalry, most 
of studied that touch the matters of knighthood being mostly linked to studies about Northern of 
Baltic Crusades and the local Military Orders. Only true connection between the events in Baltics 
and the Hundred Years War being the Reisen in Prussia and Lithuania, that a considerable amount of 
English and French knights visited. 
  Considering  chivalric  honour  being  essentially  reputation  and  recognition,  his  standing 
among his peers and brothers-in-arms, what can there be discussed? First is the question what were 
the sources of chivalric honour but also dishonour? This question is greatly about things that could 
grant recognition, both positive and negative. This question also touches on keeping or preserving 
one's honour. The second direction is more about practicality and pragmatism, if put in a form of 
question, it would be: Was there actually any dishonour and how rigid or flexible was the chivalric  
sense of honour? It would be hard to believe that the concept of honour ruled chivalry so much that 
it would have overruled more practical applications to war and other issues. Was dishonour just a 
limited  concept  left  only  describing  especially  shameful  and  despicable  acts,  or  did  wrongful 
actions still matter and affect the knights social standing? This question also touches on the fact that 
how flexible  the chivalric  codes  of honour were,  how could possibly dishonourable actions  be 
justified, perhaps even turned even acceptable. The last thought about the matter is the usage of 
reputation. Was honour “used” in some way, how could it have been helpful? Reputation can affect 
in  many ways as  does  the wish to  gain its  positive aspect  and avoid the negative.  How much 
knightly honour itself was used, was it just how a knight was respected and seen in chivalric society 
or could it have affected  his life or mattered is some ways more? These questions might seem 
generic,  yet  they  allow  the  throughout  observation  of  the  subject  and  can  lead  to  both  other 
questions. A little side question is the nature of the exemplary chapter, that is discussed under the 
sources used, it offers both material and focus to some parts of the paper, but its mostly just a case 
among other. Still its interesting nature deserves some observation.
5 Kaueper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe, 126
6 Discussing these matters through Froissart's descriptions of cases of capture and captivity 
offers a interesting viewpoint to the question. In addition to them other descriptions and works of 
other chroniclers are used to offer comparisons and additional information. Cases of capture being 
situations where a knight or squire is captured in a combat or other similar situation, the act of 
combat being the part of the case. Cases involving captivity are mostly about treatment of prisoners, 
events happening during it and termination of the captivity, in whatever way it happens (release,  
escape,  execution).  Although informative,  since capturing and ransoming noble prisoners was a 
major  part  of  chivalric  warfare,  this  viewpoint  also creates  limitations,  when trying  to  make a 
throughout discussion about matters of battlefield and everyday life. The study is written in two 
major parts, first considering honour questions on the field and the second outside of it, discussing 
the subject through all these aspects of chivalric mind.
1.3. Sources
The primary source used in this thesis is the Book I (covers time period from 1322-1377) of 
Froissart's chronicles (Chronicle of Jean Froissart), one of the most known and through chronicles 
about the Hundred Years War. Written by a contemporary secular clerk named Jean Froissart. Based 
on works of Jean le Bel, Chandos Herald and information gathered from heralds and memories of 
various persons he interviewed, his chronicle contains a massive amount of information about the 
Anglo-French conflict.6 Still its not the account of events that makes his chronicle so useful, there 
are a considerable amount of mistakes and inaccuracies in his chronicles, enough to question the 
reliability of his texts. On the other hand its the intention and way how he writes that is important.  
Because wanting to offer an inspiration for his readers to do great deeds, Froissart opens a window 
into the mind of his contemporary nobility, what were their values and how they wanted to see 
themselves. Even besides that Froissart's love of detail offers a considerable amount of information,  
even about the less than inspiring material in warfare, what still  might have been.7 There are a 
number of descriptions that involve knights being captured or involve captivity in some form, often 
there is only a mention given, but others get a line or two. King Jean II is probably the one with the 
longest as being also perhaps the most illustrious and well known case of capture in the chronicle 
and in history of the Hundred Years War. Some members of knighthood  on both sides managed to 
be captured several  times,  in some cases this  leading to  further  complications for the prisoner. 
6 Curry, Anne. The Hundred Years War, 7-8
7 Fowler, Kenneth. Froissart, Chronicler of Chivalry. History Today 36, issue 5, 50-54
7Others involve some event in captivity which can include honouring the prisoner or are about the 
end of the captivity, perhaps touching some other matter in chivalric culture.
Among  the  descriptions  of  capture  and  captivity  is  a  interesting  chapter8 in  Froissart's 
description of the battle of Poitiers. Beings et after the main description of the battle, French knight  
Oudart de Renty and a squire Jean de Helennes are shown fleeing from the battle. These are two 
separate descriptions, but share a similar element, they both discover that they are being pursued by 
an English knight and decide to fight, managing to defeat, capture and ransom him. All this getting 
a rather clear and through description. Froissart typically describes heroic deeds to inspire future 
generations, but something in  these two cases of  French knightly success, while the France had 
suffered a devastating defeat. Is there any grain of truth in this event? Geoffery le Baker's chronicle 
offers  an  conflicting  description  of  Maurice  de  Berkeley's  capture,  showing  the  knight  being 
captured by a force of numbers and maybe in a different point in battle,9 the only thing that can be 
confirmed  being  that  the  knight  was  captured  and  wounded  in  Poitiers.10 But  as  stated,  when 
discussing chivalric culture, the way how Froissart writes is more important than the accuracy of it.  
Considering chivalric culture there are two ways how this chapter can be viewed. First as a example 
for knighthood what courage and prowess can accomplish even on a lost day and second being 
perhaps Froissarts attempt to show the French chivalry in a better light in a lost battle. Anyway this 
and the way how many aspects of chivalric warfare can be seen in it, I am using the term exemplary 
chapter when discussing or using the descriptions of those two cases.
The other chronicles are used for comparison or finding additional information. Chandos 
Herald  offers  the  Life  of  The  Black  Prince. Events  in  the  “Edwardian”  war  (1337-1360)  are 
described  the  Najera  campaign gets  a  longer  overview.  The Heralds  writing  is  not  so  much  a 
chronicle but a eulogy to two great knights:  The Black Prince and John Chandos.  Geoffery Le 
Baker's  Chronicle also  has  a  strong  emphasis  of  the  life  of  the  Black  Prince  and  end  with 
descriptions of the Battle of Poitiers. It occasionally gives off a strong Pro-English feel, especially 
when describing French kings as usurpers or describing the Anglo-French conflict,  his writings 
perhaps  influenced  by  the  claim  on  French  throne  by  Edward  III.  Both  chronicles  although 
informative, don't offer a similar view to chivalric culture as Froissart's writings do, but seem to be  
considered  more  accurate  as  historical  sources.  Lastly  Enguerrand  de  Monstrelet  intended  to 
continue Froissart's work, writing in a similar style and wanting to describe the deeds of all who 
8 I have added the chapter to the appencix of this thesis
9 Le Baker, Geoffery, Chronicle, 78
10 http://www.thepeerage.com/p2570.htm#i25699 18.04.15
8were involved, offering a view into the second half  of the Hundred Years War, his work being 
continued by other authors while using his name. There are of course more chronicles talking bout 
the Hundred Years War, like Jean le Bel who was a source for Froissart and covers time from the 
end of the 13th century to the Treaty of Bretigny. In addition to chronicles there are two chivalric 
handbooks that also offer a view into the knightly mind. The contemporary to the Hundred Years 
War is the Book of Chivalry (Livre de Chevalerie) , written by the knight Geoffroy de Charny, the 
handbook was probably meant to teach young members of the Company of The Star and in general 
meant  to  reform French chivalry than he and Jean II  saw having failed from its  former glory, 
because  nobility  had  become too  lazy and  greedy.  For  Chanry the  capacity  and  deeds  on  the 
battlefield  are  the  primary concern  and source  of  worth.  Being a  contemporary practitioner  of 
chivalry, he offers the view into the preferences and actual ideals of the knighthood, while trying to 
keep them practical as possible. If anything can be said about Charny, its seems that he lived up to 
what he write to his book. Ramon Llull's “The Book of The Order of Chivalry (Llibre qui es de  
l'ordre de cavalleria) is a similar treatise, although perhaps with stronger religious tones are more 
idealising than Charny's closer to the ground work.
1.4. Historiography
There  are  a  considerable  amount  of  books,  articles  and  papers  on  matters  of  Medieval 
culture, history and chivalry, but a more limited amount when discussion directly chivalric culture 
itself. I will be concentrating on some of the primary studies of chivalric culture and those that I 
have managed to have some contact with and what are available in English. There is a considerable 
amount of research available in German and French languages, but because of limited linguistic 
capacity  in  those  languages,  I'm  limited  to  the  materials  available  in  English.  Also  since  i'm 
concentrated on secular aspects of chivalric culture, the materials about crusading are not touched 
here. The heart or core of chivalry, especially in the form it was in medieval England, France (and 
Burgundy) seems to have been deeply studied,  all  major  parts  covered,  but  there is  more than 
enough room for different viewpoints and smaller works in the matter.
Johan Huizinga's Autumn of the Middle Ages (in some versions Waning of the Middle ages) 
is probably the book that started studies about chivalric culture,  serving as a starting point and 
inspiration of many. Although some of ideas given there about chivalric culture, especially touching 
chivalric display can still be considered when discussing chivalric culture, his view that chivalry 
9was mostly a façade, a coping mechanism to late medieval nobility to tolerate the grimness of their  
lives has been refuted, by studies that show Chivalry as a far deeper cultural phenomenon.
Maurice Keen has contributed a lot into the study of medieval culture, especially the sucject 
of chivalry. His first book “Laws of War in Late Middle Ages” offers a through overview of the “law 
of  arms”  in  14th and  15th century  Western  Europe.  Discussing  the  conduct  of  war,  ransoming, 
allegiance and legal cases involving them, Keen shows how much of that was based around the 
concept of sworn word of a nobleman. His study has been a valuable contribution referenced and 
used  in  other  studies  about  chivalric  culture.  Throughout  his  life  and carrier  Keen has  written 
several more books on Middle Ages.  Chivalry  is perhaps the best overview of chivalric culture, 
although not going deep into every aspect of chivalry, it gives a considerable amount of information 
about it, giving a clear view what it was and serves as an excellent starting point for studying or  
researching chivalry.
From other works that offer a general overview about knighthood and chivalry,  Richard 
Barber's Knight and Chivalry and and Malcolm Vale's War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic  
Culture in England, France and Burgundy in The End of The Middle Ages. Can be brouht up. 
Although covering  less  subject  than  Keen's  work,  Barber's  book offers  an  decent  overview of 
history of chivalry, while Vale's book talks less about chivalric culture and more about tournament 
warfare in 15th century, offering views into that subject
Considering how much about chivalry can be learned from Froissart's chronicle that at some 
times touces the borders of  chivalric literature, how much can be found from other writings, more 
of less fictional? Richard W. Kaueper's Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe examines the 
connection  between medieval  nobility  and chivalric  literature,  finding that  even  more  fictional 
narratives  as  a  source  of  studying  the  chivalric  mentality,  carrying  among  heroic  fiction  a 
considerable amount of what knightly mind could have found acceptable or worthy. Several other 
books and studies offer different insights to chivalry.  D'Arcy Jonathan Boulton's  Knights of The 
Crown offers  the  history  of  chivalric  orders  and  different  obligations  and  traditions  in  them. 
Matthew  Strickland's  War  and  Chivalry:  The  conduct  and  perception  of  war  in  England  and  
Normandy, although concentrating on earlier times than 14th century, his works give an excellent 
overview of chivalric culture and how it acted in warfare. 
The last years have given perhaps few most thorough studies about chivalric culture. The 
10
first  being  For  Honour  and  Fame:  Chivalry  in  England  1066-1500 an  overview  of  English 
knighthood, chivalric culture and its history, while the second can be perhaps considered one of the 
best studies in chivalry and its values is Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the  
Hundred Years War. It combines a massive amount of earlier information into a single book that 
gives an overview of French chivalry in late middle ages. Although concentrated of French chivalry 
it offers a considerable amount of information about chivalric culture, its ideals, values and how 
they applied to the conduct in life and war for Western European knighthood in general.
There are other books and works abut the subject but those are books that are most strongly 
about chivalric culture and its sense of the world. Overall most studies acknowledge chivalry as a  
form of aristocratic culture in middle ages.
2. Courage and Prowess: Honour on the Field
2.1. Cowardice to Courage
The exemplary chapter begins with descriptions of Oudart de Renty11, a French knight who 
is fleeing from the lost battle of Poitiers (1356). In a similar way is also shown Jean de Helennes a 
squire who has quitted the king's battalion and having gotten a horse, is also trying to get away from 
the victorious English. Both men find themselves being pursued by a English knight and decide to 
attack their pursuer, managing to defeat and capture him.12 Its not hard see to some kind of morale 
behind these descriptions, as a possible example of what courage and prowess can accomplish even 
in a lost battle. In a simpler sense it can be seen as a description of how courage defeats cowardice.  
Bravery or rather courage was often seen among highest qualities of chivalry and perhaps its the 
one ideal that is the same or very similar in actual chivalry and the common modern understanding 
of it. On the other hand its opposite cowardice was unsurprisingly among things to be avoided to 
prevent shame and dishonour.13 In a way it seems that if anything was truly dishonourable then it 
was cowardice or fleeing from battle.
But what meant courage and its opposite in chivalric culture overall? Courage itself while 
being a knightly ideal was also considered to be among Christian virtues. Earlier church writers 
considered it  to be a part  or aspect of the virtue fortitude (fortitudo).  Thomas Aquinas made a 
stronger step towards defining the nature of courage, describing its primary aspect as moderating 
fear  and  boldness  for  common  good  and  seeing  promotion  of  fearlessness  and  bravery  as  a 
secondary  aspect.14 Such  was  the  view of  church  authors,  but  what  ere  the  view  of  chivalric 
authors? Many of them praised it as one of the most necessary traits for a knight. Ramon Llull in his 
Book of The Order of Chivalry makes it a part of the very nature of a knight, when giving his 
fictional origin of the knighthood, he talks about people being separated to groups of thousand and 
from a being chosen one  person with  necessary qualities,  courage  being one  of  them.15 When 
discussing matters further the author stresses the necessity of courage to the knight, even stating that 
a knight who leaves his liege on the battlefield, because he gives in to fear, is not worthy of being a  
knight.16 Geoffroi de Charny, a contemporary of the Hundred Years War shares the view in his Livre  
11 In some translations and versions his surname is Roucy, or Rency.
12 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html 08.04.15
13 Contamine, War in The Middle Ages, 253
14 Ibid, 250-251
15 Llull, Ramon, www.rgle.org.uk/Llull_B_C.htm 13.04.151
16 ibid
12
de Chevaliere also lists courage and boldness among the traits necessary to be a worthy man-at-
arms.17 Both men were practising knights themselves had a grasp of actual values or opinions in the 
knighthood. Charny himself is shown living up to his ideas in Froissart's chronicle, in his decision 
to fight the English forces after the failed infiltration of Calais(1349) that lead to his capture18 or his 
death  in  Poitiers,  where  he  is  killed  while  carrying  the  royal  flag  Oriflamme.19 In  fact,  when 
describing  events  in  Calais,  Foissart  gives  a  reflection  of  the  chivalric  view  of  courage  and 
cowardice, Charny's decision to stay and fight is met by English praise, with following words given 
to them: “By St. George,” said some of the English, who were near enough to hear it, “you speak  
truth: evil befal him who thinks of flying.”20
To show bravery in front  of great  danger,  overwhelming odds or in certain defeat were 
something  chivalric  writers  loved  to  show chivalric  bravery,  straight  to  the  Song  of  Roland.21 
Oudart de Renty and Jean de Helennes might find their courage, but the most credit of bravery 
among the French in Poitiers gets Jean II. Froissart describes the king bravely fighting until the end 
of the battle, stating that if a quarter of his forces would have fought like he did, the day had been 
his.22 Might this be a stab at French knights who had retreated from battle or just kind words about a 
monarch that most both a battle and his freedom? Jean II unwillingness to retreat from battle is even 
mentioned  by  Le  Baker,  although  he  does  make  it  less  about  bravery  and  more  about 
overconfidence.23 Did the king choose to stay on the battlefield because of his courage or did he get 
no chance to leave from the battlefield. Historians generally believe that Jean II decided to not flee 
because of his  promotion of highest  ideals,  although there is  some thought that his  resentment 
towards his father might have influenced his decision to stay on the field.24 Of course he is not the 
only king Jean who becomes and example of courage in Froissart's writings. In Crecy(1346), Jean 
de Luxembourg, the blind king of Bohemia decides to participate in the battle despite his disability. 
Two of his kings bind him and his horse between them and they enter the fight, doing great deeds 
until being overwhelmed and killed, while Charles the king's son is shown to pull his forces out and 
retreat.25 Tere are two things that Froissart doesn't mention, first Le Bel's mention of the knights 
17 Charny, Geoffroi. Book of Chivalry, 84
18 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap150.html 09.04.15
19 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html 08.04.15
20 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap150.html 09.04.15
21 Taylor. Craig . Military Courage and Fear in the Late Medieval French Chivalric Imagination. Journal of Medieval 
and Humanistic Studies, 129
22 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html 08.04.15
23 Le Baker, Geoffery. Chronicle, in Barber, The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, 78
24 Boulton, D'Arcy, Jonathan, Dacre. Knights of the Crown, The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval 
Europe, 168-169
25 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap129.html 11.04.15
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helping their sovereign on pain of death,26 but also the fact that the king might have chosen that 
action because his own shameful retreat earlier in the battle of Vottem (1346)27 Both kings seem to 
have come to face with the shame of cowardice, one Jean wanting to avoid it and the other wanting 
to redeem his and perhaps his lines name.
This  leads  to  the  question,  was cowardice  the  greatest  source  of  dishonour in  chivalric 
culture? Certainly there existed strong views against it and clear connections with shame. When 
looking at the case of Oudart de Renty this element of that can be seen in the words given of his 
pursuer: ”Sir knight, turn about: you ought to be ashamed thus to fly.” Hearing these words is 
enough for the knight to attack his pursuer.28 This is not the only case where the connection of 
cowardice and shame is brought up in a confrontation. If Froissart is to be believed, the successful 
French military commander Bertrand du Guesclin managed to gain freedom thanks to hinting at his 
captors, the Black Prince's lack of courage. The chronicler describes the former in a situation where 
he was imprisoned by the English and because his advisers council, the Prince was not granting him 
a change of ransom. In one of their conversations the French commander makes a comment that 
although  being  imprisoned,  he  is  enjoying  being  the  most  honourable  knight  in  the  world, 
explaining that in France and other countries people were talking that the prince is so afraid of him 
that he is not wanting to set him free. The latter feeling ashamed, sets a high ransom to him. 29 Du 
Guesclin himself had to defend his honour before the battle of Najera(1367). After his plan to wait 
with the battle and let famine weaken Black Prince's forces was ignored by the Spanish he was also  
accused in cowardice although a skilled commander, Du Guesclin took a prominent position on the 
battlefield to prove him not being a coward.30 These cases certainly give a strong view how much 
stigma carried the notion of being considered a coward among knighthood. Apparently it could have 
been enough to have princes and commanders to bad military decisions as its also believed that 
Philippe VI might had to order the premature attack in the battle of Crecy31
The knighthood's strong rejection of cowardice was also reflected in medieval culture in 
general, even church literature that was usually wary about the more warlike chivalric ideals, used 
the image of a fleeing knight to illustrate the vice of cowardice.32 Froissart is usually subtle about 
26 Le Bel, Jean. Chronicles of Jean le Bel. Contemporary chronicles of The Hundred Years War, 73
27 Taylor. Craig D. Military Courage and Fear in the Late Medieval French Chivalric Imagination, 130
28 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html 08.04.15
29 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_226-250/fc_b1_chap244.html 20.04.15
30 Taylor. Chivalry and Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War, 134
31 ibid
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such issues, unless its necessary to bring out something important to preserve or show the honour of 
the  people  present.  A comparison  of  two  cases  with  fleeing  knights  being  captured  carry  a 
considerably different message. The case of Vauflart de la Croix might be a moment where knightly 
cowardice is brought up and judged by the chronicler. The knight's capture is preceded by him 
being cut from the rest of French forces and decides to save him by taking a separate route hiding in 
the marshes until the battle was over. Although attempting to hide, he was found by the French who 
gave him over to Philippe VI, the latter deciding to give him over to the people of Lisle,  who 
decided to execute him.33 Interestingly, there seems to be an alternate description of it in the Rome 
manuscript that describes the captors executing him, because they weren't willing to ransom such a 
coward.34 Can it be in this case a hidden morale picked or written as such by Froissart to denounce 
such action? After a battle near Caen, Froissart describes English forces slaughtering the retreating 
French. Two knights, identified as constable of France (Raoul II de Brienne, Count of Eu) and earl  
of Tancerville are shown hiding under the bridge, worried that they would be killed by commoners, 
who wouldn't know to spare them because not knowing who they are and as such their value as 
prisoners. After seeing approaching a group of knights, lead by sir Thomas Holland who they knew 
from crusading, they decide to surrender to him.35 The difference is simple, knighthood accepted 
both actions of falling in battle or being captured more acceptable than a cowardly flight.36
Dishonourable death can be seen in one of the chronicler's descriptions of events after the 
battle of Crecy, where a lost or late French force accidentally meet the English and soon after the  
fight has started decide to flee.  There is  no typical Froissart's statement how brave deeds were 
made, just a cold statement how many French were killed, their corpses left lying in the wilds and 
that the English would have killed a lot more if they would have had the chance. 37 Although death 
might have been a fitting punishment for cowardice in Froissart's pen or in chivalric literature, 
death could become very easily an fleeing soldiers fate,  the largest amounts of casualties were 
among fleeing on the fact that it was easier to kill a opponent.38 Keen has noted that extreme cases 
of cowardice could have been punished by death, but most men-at-arms could suffer deshonouring, 
typically as markings on their arms or reversing them in public places.39 Perhaps the best way to 
observe  such  practices  can  be  seen  in  obligations  and  punishments  given  to  members  of 
33 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_051-075/fc_b1_chap058.html
34 Taylor. Military courage and fear in late medieval French chivalric imagination, 6
35 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_101-125/fc_b1_chap123.html 18.04.15
36 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap130.html 09.04.15
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monarchical  orders  of  chivalry  who  were  found  guilty  in  dishonourable  actions,  in  this  case 
cowardly flight from battlefield. Such thing was done in the short-lived Company of The Star, that 
had a very specific obligation to its members. No member of the order could retreat more than 4 
arpents (6 acres from a battle), failing in it the member was suspended his, arms displayed reversed 
and he could be expelled if he didn't manage to clear his name.40 From later stages of war other 
examples can be found, one of the most known Sir John Fastolf's retreat in the battle of Patay in  
1429. The battle was a loss to the English, with Monstrelet  describing the English commander 
fleeing from the battle without striking a blow and for that being suspended from the Order of The 
Garter.41
Froissart  makes  little  notion  of  fear  of  knights  being  wary or  fearful  of  the  dangers  of 
warfare. Considering him to writing rather a example of great deeds for future knights, showing his 
brave examples feeling fear probably didn't belong in his intentions, neither would have wanted to 
see this patrons nor people in described there. In fact some of the persons interviewed by Froissart 
probably weren't willing to even make a mention of having felt fear or despair. Not to a chronicler 
and not  to  young members  of  their  households,  who yet  had to  learn the  experience of  war. 42 
Froissart himself is listed as a example of chivalric chroniclers and literature in general who never  
discuss or mention fear directly.43 His mentions being more subtle or rather directed at foes of his 
exemplary heroes, like descriptions how enemies are falling back in fear of some knights prowess 
or attacks. A mention of fear still comes up in the descriptions of great deeds or adventures, mostly 
in forms or some persons worry or wish to be avoiding some certain fate. When describing the 
imprisonment of Raymond d'Marneil, a knight who had switched from the English to the French, 
the knights situation is described by pitiful and great distress, because he knew that he will be given 
over to vengeful Edward III.44 Froissart's preference to avoid direct mentions of things his readers 
might have been unwilling to admit doesn't mean that knighthood would have ignored the existence 
or feeling of fear.  Richard Kaueper has argued that there is  a considerable amount of chivalric 
literature where exist  descriptions of knights feeling fear before battles.45 More than often they 
accepted its presence, fully aware of the risks and dangers present on the battlefield. Charny is  
probably the best example, in his  Livre de Chevaliere  he touches on the aspect of fear and risks, 
40 Boulton, Knights of the Crown, 196
41 Monstrelet, Enguerrand de. The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet, 306
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encouraging young men-at-arms to overcome fear46 Charny's view of overcoming the fear is a more 
practical and actual view. It can be argued that the very point of chivalric culture's condemnation of 
cowardice was to discourage it, by making the person who left the battle without fighting seem as 
shameful and dishonourable as possible.
In the end it can be argued that chivalric culture emphasized the shame of cowardice and 
importance of courage as a method of combating fear that members of knighthood. The first might 
be seen in cases such as Vauflart's possible ignoble death, but in general Froissart seems to prefer 
telling about heroes of “his age” or past to anyone who might come later. Many chivalric writers  
went that way, telling such tales with the intention to awaken courage and will for great deeds in 
their  readers.47 Froissart  certainly  has  a  lot  of  them,  but  this  brings  back  the  element  of  the 
exemplary chapter.  Its not hard to argue that the element of courage plays  a large role in this, 
certainly showing to members of knighthood what can be accomplished when not giving into fear.  
Can it go so far that it can be compared to Arthurian stories of a cowardly knight or handsome 
coward, where the latter discovers true value of chivalry?48 Perhaps not, but the idea to look the 
descriptions having such cautionary nature is tempting. Together with Jean II bravery in not leaving 
the field it can be guessed that it might be written to lessen the effect of French failure in the battle 
of Poitiers. Although several questions can be asked about the connection of Exemplary chapter and 
matters of courage, one of them being were Oudart and Jean actually cowards who found or was 
there something justifiable in their retreat?
2.2. Honourable retreat and justifications of flight
Although  fleeing  from  battle  was  a  shameful  and  dishonourable  act,  then  it  mist  be 
remembered that chivalry wasn't as foolhardy or empty-headedly brave as t has been sometimes 
mistakenly shown, there was the understanding that sometimes retreat or withdrawal is necessary, 
although in some cases it still carried the risk of invoking shame in the eyes of opponents and the 
knights themselves.49 Looking at the exemplary chapter and the idea of it being about two knights 
finding their courage, their initial actions seem blatantly clear. But even then some facts must be 
considered,  namely  are  the  fleeing  combatants  actually  fleeing  or  just  retreating,  is  there  any 
46 Charny, Book of Chivalry, 62
47 Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood 152
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question of dishonour involved before the challenge or statement given by de Renty's pursuer? The 
question of if a knight can leave combat or his companions without any issues is clearly illustrated 
in the 13th century chronicler Jean de Joinville's work Lige of Saint Louis. The chronicler describes 
an battle in the Seventh Crusade where he and other knights were being under a heavy attack, one 
of them a knight named Erard de Sivrey asked if he or his heirs would suffer any loss in any honour  
if we would leave them in attempt of trying to get help. Joinville describes himself stating that the 
danger that leaving and his success would have been a greater honour.50 The problem faced by Erard 
de Sivrey might seem a weird one, why would even such question come up when the knight was 
planning to leave his companions only with the intention of getting help? It can be argued that in 
case if he had failed, some of his companions might have had thoughts that his only intention was to 
run away, but more important is the fact of this consideration existing. Chivalry seemed to accept 
the necessity, but also the existence of the question. Charny for example lists the knowledge to 
when and how honourably surrender of retreat among knowledge every good man-at-arms must 
know.51
There is one important fact that must be noted in the descriptions of the exemplary chapter, 
in both descriptions the flight seems to be happening after the end of the battle. The chapter himself 
is set after the description of the battle itself, neither of those events is shown in middle of battle, 
rather both knights are shown as stragglers that had managed to get away from main English host.  
In de Renty's case its learned that he had quitted the battle when it had become clear that the day 
was irrevocably lost and de Helennes having quit the king's division. At least in first case it could be 
considered that the flight could have happened in the end. This can be compared to the case in 
Caen. A usual medieval battle ended with a rout. This was a moment where the remaining armies 
morale broke and started a flight, on the same time being the most dangerous and lethal phase of the 
fight to the lost side.52  As the constable and count de Tancerville after Caen, there might be the 
aspect of there be nothing wrong in their “cowardly actions” because the battle was already lost. In 
general retreating or fleeing from a certainly lost battle might have had very little reproach. For 
example the Knights of The Temple allowed its members to retreat without any reproach if there 
were no Christian banners left flying on the rallying point.53 Chivalric writers took the stand in the 
form of showing the importance of having participated in battle,  Christine de Pizan voiced his 
opinion about the matter that soldiers who flee without striking a blow should be punished.54 The 
50 Joinville, Jean de, Life of Saint Louis, 221
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latter view being shared in Monstrelet's account of sir John Fastolf's actions. A bit opposite to such 
views feels the obligation of the order of the golden fleece that forbade its members to flee after  
they had unfurled their pennons.55 Of course this might be a bit opposite but linked issue, with 
withdrawal being seen acceptable, until the knight hadn't given a sign that he is going to participate. 
But in general the feelings seem to have been towards that there is no reproach in fleeing from a lost 
battle.
Did king Jean II have a chance to actually retreat from the battle and in any reproach to his  
honour? The kings decision to stay on the battlefield has been criticised as much foolhardy as was 
the tactically harsh obligation given to the Company of The Star. There is actually something odd in 
that  demand,  considering  that  Charny  himself  brings  up  the  importance  of  knowing  when  to 
honourably retreat  in his  writings.56 In addition to his  Livre de chevalierie,  he himself  was the 
person responsible for “building” the company, the question about honourable retreat was present 
also in the Demandes,  one of his writings that was directly directed towards new members of the 
order,  the  answers  to  these  questions  aren't  known  and  might  have  been  just  created  for  the 
members to read and think about chivalry.57 But certainly it makes it seem rather odd. When looking 
at the obligation that states that knights were suspended, until they had their chance to explain and 
be judged, not expelled directly, it can be guessed that there might have been some less foolhardy 
aspect  in  it,  but  rather  some  acceptance  of  realities  of  warfare.  Sadly  because  of  the  order's 
devastating defeat in the battle of Mauron (1352),58 that was soon after its founding, there weren't 
probably any time to have meetings to discuss if a knight's flight had been justifiable or not. There  
is also almost nothing known about event in Mauron, with chroniclers making bare mention of it, 
stating only that the order found his end there.59 Looking at the case of sir John Fastolf the fact that 
he was only temporarily suspended from the Order of The Garter, apparently having managed to 
explain the circumstances to Duke Bedford who at the moment was the Regent to Henry VI and 
leader on the English forces60
Although there is very little known of the decision that made Fastolf to leave the battle or 
why his actions were found right. Jean de Buleil praised him for saving his men from a devastating 
defeat while Jean de Waurin, one of his own subordinates describes the action taken more on the 
55 Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood144
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pressure of his captains and sergeants.61 Such comments of rulers and commanders being forced to 
leave the field because failure or cowardice of their men is a common thing in chivalric chronicles,  
this will be discussed below when discussing some retreats of rulers and princes. This is good when 
talking about matters of honourable retreat in matters of Jean II' father and heir. In a way the king's 
chivalric stand in battle is contrasted with the fact that his father had left the battle of Crecy and his 
eldest on Charles, duke of Normandy (future Charles V) had retreated with his brothers Louis and 
Jean from the battle of Poitiers. An question can be asked, was Jean II disturbed or angered by his 
sons actions?. At least Le Baker describes the King being angered and swearing an oath of not 
leaving the battlefield, although his description is more oriented towards king's overconfidence,62 its 
an unsure idea, but certainly not impossible.. Combined with the strained relationship between Jean 
II and his father and blaming military failures on the French failure of chivalry,63 might he have felt 
that his son by leaving had besmirched the family honour and as such he had to uphold it? Froissart 
is of another opinion of his family members. Already his source Le Bel mentions Philippe VI still 
trying to rally his forces, until being lead away by Jean de Hainault, who grabs his horse by its  
bridle, to fight and win another day.64  This  description also leads to a question that is important to 
consider when talking about honourable retreat, that being how possibly cowardly actions were 
turned more acceptable by the chroniclers, by offering justifications to it. Considering that it was 
less shameful to flee from a battle that was already lost, its hard to look Philippe VI retreat after his  
forces were broken, as something unreasonable. Considering Crecy being more lethal than most 
Anglo-French conflicts because giving quarter or surrendering may not have been a possibility.65 He 
can be hardly blamed for deciding to retreat in such circumstances and probably grasped very well 
how much harm could his capture or death cause.
The cowardice  or  leaders  of  followers  being  to  blame is  also  emphasized  in  Froissart's 
description of the retreat of his sons. Froissart makes it clear that the princes themselves might have 
wanted to fight, but being young they trusted too much the words and wisdom of older and more 
experienced knights who were fighting under their command. They had started worrying when saw 
the success  of  the English and as  the  chronicler  describes  them to  think  how they could save 
themselves from battle. They managed to persuade the princes to leave, who took some of their  
forces with them.66 There is some both on the same conflict, but also connection with Le Baker's 
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description of it, especially in the part that describes the Dauphin's forces being broken and forced 
to flee.67 Did it happen in such way or can a combination of events be expected is good question.  
Although here can be seen something that was used by Waurin to justify Fastolf's retreat in Patay.  
Unlike that example, some of the of the men under the dauphin's command aren’t dishonourable 
cowards either. Three knights are described as being responsible for getting the heir to safety: Jean 
de Landas, Theobald de Bodenay and a person referred just as lord of St. Venant. The first are  
shown helping the dauphin to get away from the battlefield and after sure of his safety decide to 
return to the battle. The third knight in question was left to guard the dauphin, with the former 
stating that in this way he will gain more in honour.68 Certainly something that reflects the honour in 
actions of Erard de Sivrey, where leaving the battle because of a greater need, in his case getting 
help for his companions and in the case of “Lord of St.Venant” the protection of king's heir. In 
Froissart's description both knights return to the battle, Jean de Landas being listed as having fallen 
in battle.  In addition there is   a very specific comparison meeting the duke of Orleans  who is  
described having quit the king's rear, his ranks full of knights and squires who had followed their 
leader, but would have rather died than suffered any reproach.69
In  a  interesting  way  both  descriptions  can  be  compared  to  Ramon  Llull's  comment 
connecting cowardice and lack of loyalty, how knights who give in to fear instead serving under 
their lieges banners not neing worthy of the status of knighthood, that is mentioned in the beginning 
of the chapter. Jean de Hainault and the lords described when talking about Dauphin's retreat might 
be blamed in battlefield, but in the end they do it from loyalty to their lieges, finding their protection 
and safety more important than honour in the battlefield. Honour is also present among those who 
are in service of Duke of Orleans, their loyalty contrasting their lieges cowardice.
In many ways the questions of courage versus necessary retreat are complex. In the end it 
could  be  stated  that  fleeing  without  a  good  reason,  it  being  either  a  battle  lost  without  any 
possibility or recovery as can be possibly seen in the cases of the Exemplary chapter. Others might 
have been forced to this position or had to do it from necessity, loyalty perhaps being another way 
that could have made a retreat acceptable. Some return to the flight or retreat of Oudart de Renty is  
perhaps necessary. Is his flight to escape the English because he is wanting to avoid falling into 
their hands cowardly or would he had some good reasons to avoiding that?
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2.3. Prowess and Chivalric Warfare
There  are  reasons  to  see  the  exemplary chapter  as  an  Froissart's  attempt  to  show what 
courage and prowess can accomplish no matter the circumstances and certainly a lot can be said 
about the role of courage, but what about the other important quality? If courage is shown in the 
fact that the fleeing French decided to fight instead or continuing their flight, then prowess comes 
up in the descriptions how both men manage to defeat their enemies. Oudart de Renty manages to 
be better with a lance, unhorsing his opponent who falls on the ground stunned. Jean de Helennes 
both disarms his opponent and delivers a severe wound by thrusting his blade through Maurice de 
Berkeley's thighs.70 Such descriptions are common in Froissart's chronicle, at some level they might 
feel like fillers of illustrations between accounts of actual events and indeed, most of them are the 
latter, a way to Froissart to describe the great deeds that he wrote to inspire future men-at-arms to 
great deeds, something he prefers to be describing over the accurate account of events. Illustrations 
or  not,  these  still  carry some considerable  information  about  the  primary source  of  honour  in 
chivalric mind. As Froissart writes in the beginning of some versions of his chronicle: As firewood 
cannot burn without a flame, so cannot honour and glory cannot be gained without prowess.71 
Prowess (prousesse) was a straightforward quality, it was the knight's strength and skill in 
combat, his ability to unhorse, wound or kill his opponent in a violent, physical contest.72 Such 
views are also supported by chivalric writers, among them Charny being the one who draws the 
strongest connection between honour and prowess. In his Livre de Chevaliere he states how there 
are no bad deeds in arms, only good and better, although some are more honourable than others. 
This continues with a categorisation of them until he reaches statement that from the all, the deeds 
in war are the most honourable.73 In a way even Llull's Book of Order of chivalry starts in a similar 
way, the hermit who teaches the young squire about the nature of knighthood is a former knight 
who chose seclusion because his age had him too weak to be a knight and as such he didn't want to 
dishonour his noble calling.74 Both authors statements carry the message of importance of physical 
ability and skill  on the knights part,  with Charny going deep into the heart  of  chivalry.  If  the 
descriptions in the exemplary chapter would be looked through the lends of his writings then it 
could be stated that the knight's and squires decision to fight instead of fleeing was honourable, but 
greater honour was the defeating of their opponents. Might there be seen the practical consideration 
70 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html 08.04.15
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of getting rid of your pursuer to getting away? The importance of prowess as the primary source of 
honour creates some other interesting connections with other chivalric ideals such as loyalty or 
largesse, the first is showed in chivalric literature as a way of directing prowess to a right direction 
and allowing it to become honourable and the other being enabled by it.75
Whole reputations could be built  with the help of skill  in  arms. Guillaume le Marechal 
(William Marshal)  was a landless knight,  but with his victories in tournaments had earned him 
enough renown that he was selected to be young Herny II teacher and the person who knighted him, 
the latter usually being a person with higher social standing, but his prowess and success managed 
to win him that position.76 Its good to note here that the success that lead “The best knight in the 
world” there had very little to do with actual war, most of it was success on the tournament field, 
with a lucky chance that had brought him to the attention of the English royal house.77 Such steep 
promotions were of course rare, but did happen. Bertrand du Guesclin, a relatively low-born Breton 
knight was made constable of France by Charles V.78 Still through his successes Du Guesclin is 
considered among greatest commanders in The Hundred Years War, and person who managed to 
turn around France's military fortunes during the Caroline phase of war.79 Although both men share 
in becoming defined among greatest knights of their time, it would be wrong to think that chivalric 
culture would had only worked on appreciation of skill in arms. Froissart describes Du Guesclin 
attempting to decline the offer on basis that he is not that rich or important enough, but doesn't  
manage to sway the king.80 This was no humility or attempt to show Du Guesclin as such, the 
knight knew very well that higher ranking nobles might not accept him because of his lower status 
and might even resent for gaining a position usually reserved for more “illustrious” members of 
nobility.81 Still  those  rare  cases  bring  up  the  fact  that  recognition  and  renown gained  through 
successes in battle could lead to promotions and possibilities.82
Returning to the accomplishments in exemplary chapter or rather in Froissart's chronicle, the 
depictions of prowess must be looked, especially those speaking of show of arms or success in 
combat. Considering the  the fight between Jean de Helennes and Maurice de Berkeley as a show of 
French prowess in a battle that otherwise was lost, although Jean de Helennes is a clear winner, his  
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would-be captive is shown still attempting to get his sword he had lost in the squires attack.83 Is 
Froissart trying to make a statement that the knight would have been capable of fighting, lessening 
the blow on the knights honour? Although there was always honour in fighting, the competitive 
aspects of prowess make it rather clear that loss could lead to some shame and dishonour, in the end 
the  losing  knight  had  proven  himself  to  be  less  skilled  and  less  capable  than  his  opponent.84 
Froissart  generally tries to  show all  participating sides as honourable as  possible,85 making the 
description of  the knight  trying to  get  his  sword a little  hint  of his  prowess  and courage.  The 
description of this fight becomes somewhat more interesting when comparing it with Le Baker's 
conflicting account of events. There the brave Maurice de Berkeley breaks his shield and weapons 
while fighting the fleeing dauphins men and is  taken down and captured by many while being 
horribly  broken.86 The  chronicler  comment  seems  clear,  one  proud  English  knight  of  glorious 
lineage being being more capable than many French, who in their lack of prowess needed the force 
of numbers to take him down, on the other hand its a defence of the de Berkeley's honour, by 
showing him as capable as possible. Perhaps something similar can be seen also in case of Eustace 
d'Aubricicourt who manages to defeat one of his opponents but is soon overpowered by five others. 
How much truth was in those descriptions and how much they were chronicler's attempts to defend 
honour of remarkable persons or entire sides in a war. In any case this seems to serve as another 
example of the importance of prowess as source of honour.
Perhaps a better example of such matters can be seen in the case of capture and captivity of 
Geoffroi de Charny and Eustace d'Ribeaumont.  Their  treatment  after  a  lost  battle  carries  some 
interesting shows in the matter.  Charny who had been the organizer of the attempt to infiltrate 
Calais  by bribery,  gained rather  scornful  comment  from Edward III  about  how the knight  had 
attempted  to  gain  the  castle  a  lot  less  cheaper  and  with  less  work  than  he,  while  praising 
d'Ribeaumont as one of the best knights in the battle and France overall, giving him a fabulous gift 
for his great honour.87 His reactions to both men or how chroniclers have described the events can 
be seen in language of prowess. The words given to Charny about trying to get the city in cheaper 
and quicker way are might be a strong hint of the king making it clear who is more capable at war.  
Edward III had besieged the city of Calais for eleven months until it fell 88 and probably wasn't 
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happy that anyone decided to attempt, probably making it clear with these words who had been 
more  honourable  and  capable  in  their  attempts  in  taking  the  city.  The  case  with  Eustace 
d'Ribeaumont  is  a  different  thing,  perhaps  its  the  gift  why there  started  tales  and  chroniclers 
accounts  of  Edward  III  who  had  fought  in  the  battle  disguised89 and  supposedly  encountered 
d'Ribeaumont who he fought  long until  being separated.90 The tale  of this  fight became highly 
popular in England. Perhaps being another thing that served to cement his reputation as a highly 
chivalrous king.91
The success in battle Froissart makes the skill of victorious men-at-arms in the exemplary 
chapter clear to anyone who reads. As described, both men manage to defeat their opponents in one 
strike having proved themselves more skilled in using their chosen weapons. Especially apparent is 
this in case of Oudart de Renty, whose skilful blow at his opponents helmet leaves him stunned,  
causing him to fall on the ground. Unhorsing an opponent or managing to kill his horse instead of  
harming him needed considerable skill and training, something what as an example was used by 
Marechal to unhorse young Richard I, warning him that he could have as well killed him.92 In cases 
of both Oudart and Jean another great preference by knighthood is shown, namely the love of idea 
of defeating enemies with one strike. Chivalric narratives, including biographies show that attacks 
that  maimed  or  killed  opponents,  especially  in  a  gruesome  way  in  one  strike,  were  greatly 
appreciated.93 Its hard to argue against, it even in modern sensibilities an strike that defeats and 
opponent in one blow is an effective one, most of the evolution of weaponry has happened to gain 
such strikes. Still seeing this element played in a very highly exemplary case may give hint that  
although everybody may have loved to hear, read or or perhaps see, but everybody knew what kind 
of act could grant a quick victory and be a mark of great prowess. The more idealistic fight of Jean 
de Helennes is only a partially longer, and as stated perhaps so to keep the honour of Maurice de 
Berkeley.
When talking  about  chivalry and warfare  there  is  always  the  image of  knights  fighting 
horseback, charging with lances at their enemies. The association of knightly warfare is a strong 
one, historians have talked of  thousand year rule of cavalry when talking about medieval warfare.94 
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Exemplary chapter doesn't disappoint in that matter, both the fights start on horses and at least in 
Oudart's case involve unhorsing the opponent. Was the cavalry charge the most cherished way of 
fighting of knighthood? There is nothing that would say that knighthood had against dismounting 
and fighting on foot for the situation called, actually this was pretty common among the English in 
the  Hundred  Years  War.  Also  something  more  important  must  be  considered.  Especially  the 
difference  when  fighting  against  infantry  or  cavalry,  on  which  cases  the  situation  changed 
drastically. Against infantry the primary power of cavalry was the fear, causing them to lose morale 
and break lines, if they managed to hold their morale, then the cavalry was in trouble. But fight  
between cavalry was a different matter, instead of riding enemies down or being broken by pikes 
and arrows, the fights could become more of between knights, could break into fights between two 
men  and  showing  quarter  with  taking  prisoners  was  easier,  becoming  more  like  the  image 
associated with chivalric warfare.95 Its good to note that although fighting on horse could have been 
the most knightly way of fighting, this essentially could lead them to a dishonourable action, thanks 
to their mobility, mounted combatants were also usually among the first to flee or retreat, which 
sometimes caused monarch to order men he didn't trust to fight dismounted on the battlefield.96 
Together with the possibility of allowing the greatest  source of shame in chivalric mind, being 
mounted played also a important role in action that many romantic views wouldn't connect with 
chivalry. The  chevauchee  was a devastating form of raid that relied on quick mounted attacks.97 
The English  chevauchee-s druing the Hundred Years those lead by Edward III and Black Prince, 
were highly devastating to the French. Large areas were burned and pillaged with the intention to 
weaken French forces, but also to discredit French rulers by them failing to fulfil their obligation as 
a sovereign to protect his lands and subject.98 In such light chevauchee could be looked as a contest 
of prowess or honour between rulers,  might such view be correct?  In any way the knighthood 
seemed to see nothing despicable or wrong in devastating the common non-combatants in such way. 
The codes of conduct that gave some protection to nobility didn't just apply to commoners, leading 
to a statement by Kaueper that as a code Chivalry had nothing to do with the common man.99 
Plundering and looting themselves were already both a part and unfortunate necessity of a medieval 
army, it helped to pay them and on the same time were they necessary to  for a army to sustain and 
feed itself on enemy territory.100 So its hard to believe that knighthood had seen anything wrong, 
95 Vale, War and Chivalry. 102-103
96 Morillo, The “Age of Cavalry” revisited, 55
97 Ayton. Arms, armor and horses. Medieval Warfare: A History. 126
98 Lynn, John A. Chivalry and Chevauchee. Battle: A History of Combat and Culture. Book found in google books 
(books.google.com) lacks any page numbers. 02.05.15
99 Lynn. Chivalry and Chevauchee.
100Lynn. Chivalry and Chevauchee.
26
despicable or dishonourable in such acts, perhaps views of those whose lands suffered from major 
chevauchees might have thought differently, or started planning vengeance against the attackers
Perhaps  one  question  remains  about  prowess  and  chivalric  warfare.  The  medieval 
knighthood has been sometimes defined as a “face to face melee combat, warrior culture,”101 as 
seen in examples of the exemplary chapter or in other fights, when Froissart describes one then its a 
straight up melee combat to, but it should noted that here and then he mentions ruses and ambushes 
being used. The open field might have been the most preferred and most granting in honour,102 but 
there was no dishonour in trickery, ambushes, ruses and so on. As much as chivalric display of 
courage and honour was appreciated, so was careful planning and subterfuge.103 Edward III might 
make a comment about Charny's “easier attempt of taking the city, but the main strength seems to 
benot in the fact how the knight attempted to take the city,  but than despite his clever plan he 
failed.104 Edward III himself was a clever and capable tactician who perhaps even might have had 
some liking of the idea itself, although it can be questioned if the king would even have admitted 
such thing. The king himself of course set up a clever ruse in answer, pulling the French into a 
trap.105 Le Baker in his chronicle perhaps adds even fictional elements like fake walls being used to 
trick the French.106 In the end there was no wrong or harmful to courage, honour or prowess in 
“more clever warfare.” Chivalric warfare wasn’t foolish and this leads to the problems that too 
much courage and desire for honour could cause and how chivalric culture reacted to it.
2.4. Glory and Wisdom
Although courage and skill in battle were among the primary sources of honour, the hunt for 
the latter was not always the most praised thing. Literature and popular culture are often tended to  
show knighthood and perhaps warrior cultures in general full of brave fools or honour above reason 
attitude. The actual chivalric truth in those matters was different. Chivalric culture had enough inner 
sense to understand where overconfidence, anger and the “quest for honour” could lead, as such 
restraint and wisdom were sometimes as highly valued that courage and prowess.107 Still even with 
problems and issues acknowledged, individual knights and sometimes whole armies could fall into 
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pitfalls typically used to describe “foolhardy chivalry.” Two of such cases will be discussed here,  
one about knightly overconfidence and other about honour leading to a questionable step.
The temporary capture of Eustace d'Aubrecicourt might be seen as one of such events and 
perhaps a point where Froissart might actually wanted to show a little cautionary tale about the 
dangers of overconfidence. Before the description of the young knight's capture is the description 
how Sir James Audley asks if he could leave the Princes retinue to join the battle of the front lines, 
stating that he had swore an oath to be the best knight in the battle. Froissart describes the knight as 
prudent  and  valiant  and  after  describing  his  actions,  the  chronicler  starts  to  talk  about  how 
d'Aubrecicourt wanted to be among the first to engage the French. Discovering some German men-
at-arms who had joined the French forces he charges at them, managing to defeat one, but being 
captured by five others who take him prisoner.108 Can it be said that the young knight had been rash 
and overconfident, especially when a older and more experienced knight's prudence or wisdom is 
described before his  brave but foolhardy actions? Being too courageous or rash was seen as a 
dangerous quality. When looking at the medieval idea of courage a important aspect of of must be 
remembered: as courage moderates fear, it also moderates boldness.109 In this courage isn’t so much 
about avoiding fear, but controlling fear and bravery both, a necessary quality on the battlefield. 
Overconfidence of the French and Philippe VI anger are reasons what Froissart lists as reasons why 
the French attacked prematurely in Crecy,110 reflecting medieval chroniclers typical comments that 
placed blame on defeats to knight's or rulers overconfidence or rashness.111 
Although chivalry wasn't so honour before reason as is a common misconception of it, there 
were still a considerable number of battles where overconfidence or rashness could lead to serious 
losses and could serve as examples as such views. Or even not so much rash actions but reliance on  
honour in situations where clearer head would be needed. Looking back at the discussion about 
power of shame strongly affecting capable rulers and commanders such as the Black Prince and 
Bertrand Du Guesclin, perhaps the conversation and the way how the latter gained his ransom must 
be  considered.  Froissart  paints  a  clear  contrast  between  the  chivalrous  Black  Prince  who  had 
thought of offering a hight ransom to Du Guesclin and his advisers who were against it. After the 
ransom was offered the advisers quickly tried to persuade the Black Prince to cancel the offer, but  
the prince, didn't want to break his already given word and hoped that the high ransom of hundred 
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thousand franks would be useful and take time. Du Guesclin's connections were enough to get him 
the money quickly, releasing him to war again.112 At some level may it have also been a matter of 
honour or acting chivalrously, at least in earlier 11th and 12th century not allowing ransom to an 
external enemy was generally seen as a heinous act.113 This may have had continued to 14th century, 
but there were also rising discussions and arguments of not allowing some prisoners, especially 
skilled captains and commanders their freedom, or even execution if  necessary.114 Probably had 
some writers started discussing the risks of extending wars because of enemy leaders finding a way 
to return to the field. A high ransom could have perhaps caused delay or hardened the process. So in 
a way allowing his ransom was the honourable act for the Black Prince to do, Froissart emphasising 
that he had thought of this before. Still returning a commander as capable as Du Guesclin to the 
field just on basis of honour might not have been the wisest act.
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3. Mercy, largesse and word: Honour in Chains, Home and Law
3.1. Honour and Mercy of the Defeated
Both cases in the exemplary chapter end with their “protagonists” defeating and capturing 
their  pursuers,  leaving the battle  as winners in honour and profit.  Even the the descriptions of 
captures/surrenders are examples of ideal chivalry.  In case of Oudart  de Renty a perhaps more 
standard and down to earth variant is shown, him placing his lance on the unnamed English knight's  
breast and offering him the choice of surrender or death.115 Considering the chivalric honour's war 
and  success  in  battle  oriented  nature,  this  was  perhaps  the  way how many if  not  most  noble 
prisoners were taken. On the contrast the capture of Maurice de Berkeley by Jean de Helennes is 
given a considerably longer and perhaps more idealistic look: after severely wounding his opponent 
there is a conversation between both men, with the victorious squire offering to take care of his 
would be captives wounds and the latter making a comment in how he surrenders to one who has 
taken him in such true way.116 The description continuing with how Jean de Helennes took care if 
his wounded prisoner, taking him on slow pace to his castle and treating him out of friendship.117 
This a lot more “chivalric” description than in case of the first capture, perhaps reflecting the ideas 
of mercy and magnanimity modern understanding of the term and contemporary church ideologists 
would have wanted to see. Certainly this is a lot better looking than Le Baker's account of events.  
But even then the pragmatic nature of actual “chivalric mercy” can be seen, as he states it himself, 
the young lord of Berkeley was a high ranking and rich member of nobility, such as treating him 
well  and  taking  care  of  his  wounds  would  have  been  the  practical  thing  to  do  in  hopes  of 
considerable ransom. If instead of him would there have been a poor squire, would there be a story 
to tell? Capturing noble combatants and the compassionate treatment of them has been often seen as 
one of the defining features of chivalric warfare.118
It is unsure when did the practice actually began. Prisoners have been taken in war since the 
earliest times, but those prisoners were often enslaved or mistreated in different ways, not that the  
latter wouldn't happen in medieval warfare, but there tended to be limits, at least within the borders 
of nobility or Christendom. Gillingham has noted that there are little mentions of capturing nobles 
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alive and ransoming them before 9th century, noting that some of the earliest shifts came from after 
the battle of Foutenoy that has been considered heavy on casualties and perhaps even a changing the 
view on warfare in the are of France. After Foutenoy there are more notes about prisoners being 
taken or spared, although the practice was initially limited to “intra-wars” in France and Rhineland, 
but started slowly spreading to elsewhere.119 Orderic Vitalis an 12th century chronicler is shown 
describing how knights  are preferring to capture enemy knights  alive,  instead of killing  while 
explaining how from 900 knights only three were killed. Of course there are reasons to be careful 
about the chroniclers words, that a number of other comments about ransoming make it seem that  
the practice was growing.120 During the time of Hundred Years Wars the practice was so widespread 
and common that some historians are using the term ransom culture to define the phenomenon. 121 
The Anglo-French conflict seen as a rather “bloodless,” at least when talking about conflict between 
nobles, although the better wording would be of quarter being usually given in that conflict. The 
battle of Poitiers being perhaps being the crown of sparing noble prisoners, with an unusually large 
amount of prisoners taken, with a number of French high nobility together with King Jean being 
captured.122
Was  this  fine  treatment  of  noble  prisoners  warm mercy  or  just  cold  pragmatism?  The 
knowledge of rich ransoms being gained tends to shift the nature it towards the latter. On the other  
hand,  perhaps  it  was  the chivalric  idea of mercy:  sparing a  “brother-in-arms” while  gaining in 
worldly riches through it. A good example of this can be seen when looking at the case of Thomas 
Holland saving French knights in Caen. The French knights among them the constable of France 
and earl of Tancerville are shown to surrendering to them to be avoid being massacred by the rest of 
English forces. Froissart showing later how Thomas Holland was well compensated for the more 
important  prisoner's  under  this  care.123 When looking at  this  description,  there  can be seen  the 
element of both mercy and profit being shown. If comparing the mercy that is often attempted to 
connect with chivalry and the actual version of it, some things must be remembered. Church and 
different ideologists were the typical sources who attempted to connect chivalry stronger with some 
of more Christian ideals.  Church ideologists or or even some other theorists often tried to draw a 
stronger connection between chivalry and the idea of mercy, with attempts to show all knights as 
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members of a Christian brotherhood-in-arms and making statements that a Christian soldier should 
always attempt to take another alive and release him for either a reasonable ransom or without it.124 
Those  attempts  to  church  to  show  practices  of  knighthood  being  accordant  with  ideals  of 
Christianity or promote the latter were nice, but in the end knighthood preferred their variation of 
“practical mercy.” The latter being more based on possible profits they could have gained from the 
ransoms being the primary reason why mercy was shown to enemies.
Something else to be discussed are the matters of honour between captor and the captive. 
Although chivalric culture tended to see being captured more honourable than fleeing from battle, 
there was still a considerable difference between a person who captured and one who was forced to 
surrender.  As discussed earlier,  chivalric culture can be seen among highly competitive warrior 
cultures and as such a following note by social anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers can be used: in any 
contest the winner winds his reputation enhanced by the humiliation of his opponent.125 There are a 
considerable amount of depictions in chivalric literature how a surrendering knight is placed in a 
humiliated position: kneeling before his opponent, his neck exposed to his weapon.126 There was 
certainly satisfaction for some victors in seeing their opponents in such state, but also a moment of 
shame for a  proud man-at-arms who not only had suffered defeat,  but  also had to  rely on his 
enemy's mercy. Perhaps its that why there is considerable amount of knights in chivalric literature 
who decline offers to surrender, even avoid mentioning it and prefer to fight to the death, because 
defeat is too dishonourable to them.127 Although most members of knighthood preferred to choose 
surrendering and life if given a choice, such descriptions may certainly carry some hint at feelings 
captured members of chivalry could have felt. Froissart mentions only a few cases where members 
of knighthood declined surrender and rather in a form, one perhaps being Godfrey de Harcourt who 
in  a  lost  battle  stated  that  he  prefers  death  to  being  taken  a  statement  which  is  followed  by 
Froissart's  description  of  his  heroic  last  stand.128 Still  returning  to  the  matters  of  dishonour  in 
surrendering,  then  Froissart  makes  barely  any  mentions  of  it.  Probably  its  hard  to  find  such 
descriptions  from  his  chronicle,  but  in  most  accounts  its  seems  that  there  was  no  shame  or 
dishonour linked to being defeated and captured on a open field.129
124 Ambühl, Prisoners of War in Hundred Years War, 49
125 Pitt-Rivers, Julian. Honor and Social status, Honor and Shame, 24
126 Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of the Knighthood, 181
127 Kaueper, Chivalry and Violence, 154
128 http://www.maisonstclaire.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap171.html 20.04.15
129 Taylor, Chivalry and Ideals of the Knighthood, 200
32
Of course mercy was not always given. There might have been no chance of surrendering in 
“a battle to the death” or in a noble versus commoner situation. As mentioned earlier, quarter was 
usually given in Hundred Years Wars, but even there is the exception of Crecy. The reason why no 
prisoners were to be taken seems to be unclear.  Froissart  blames the wickedness of commoner 
pikemen and archers,  whose murderous deeds left  the king without many important ransoms,130 
while Le Baker sets the blame on French unruliness, which caused Philippe VI to unfurl the royal 
flag of Oriflamme, which meant that no quarter was to be given and caused Edward III answer with 
a similar command.131 There are thoughts that it was actually Edward III who wanting to avoid that 
some members  of  his  army would  be  interested  in  grabbing prisoner's  instead  of  fighting  and 
wanting  to  secure  his  victory  in  a  battle  against  larger  enemy  force,  may  have  given  that 
command.132 As there was the chance that the enemy would not take prisoners, there were other 
factors that could have ended with no mercy situations. One of the simplest of them being just the 
fact of feelings of anger and adrenaline on the battlefield, which could make matters harder.133 The 
view of vengeance was also string in chivalric mind, Charny for example shows being vengeful 
among  important  qualities  to  a  man-at-arms.134 Although  he  himself  took  his  vengeance  after 
capturing  his  prisoner,  the  need  for  vengeance  or  encountering  a  generally  hated  member  of 
knighthood could have been with any chance of mercy given.135 When describing the battle  of 
Poitiers, Froissart tells of a French knight named Jean de Claremont who was killed with no respite, 
owing this to an earlier encounter with John Chandos.136 This encounter in question seems to have 
been an heraldic  issue,  with both knight's  discovering  that  they are wearing same colours  and 
markings, which sparked and argument between the two.137 As it shows matters of honour or dislike 
towards enemy combatants could have been pretty much enough to cause members of knighthood 
accepting or offering the surrender.
But it is the treatment of commoner combatants that's where all the notions of mercy seem to 
be  failing.  Its  interesting  to  note  that  before  the  shift  to  chivalric  treatment  of  defeated  noble 
opponents, the non-noble combatants had the higher chance of survival, although most of them 
were enslaved, the nobles were on that time under the danger of being executed, because of their 
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capacity as warriors and rulers.138 Gillingham has even noted that the poor treatment of commoners 
on the battlefield, contrasted by the merciful treatment of members of nobility as whole can be seen 
as as a defining feature of chivalry as the latter part of it.139 Earlier historians have linked such 
treatment  often to  a  class  difference,  Huizinga in  particular  connecting it  to  knighthood seeing 
common  soldiers  outside  their  group  and  as  such  not  being  part  of  their  codes  of  conduct.140 
Although some members of knighthood might have wanted to think it  that,  the whole question 
comes down to the simple fact of profit, there was no financial or political gain being gained from 
ransoming peasantry. There seem to have been hints that at least some mentions of captured nobles 
asking their captors to spare their varles or servants, but mostly the fate of a commoner who tried to 
surrender to a noble was death.141 As such the knowledge of death being certain in hands on nobility 
made commoners more inclined to kill the former, sometimes with great cruelty. For such reasons 
nobility generally avoided surrendering to infantry or archers.142 Still it happened, at least Froissart 
makes  note  of  such events  when describing  the  events  in  Poitiers,  mentioning English  archers 
capturing French.143 There is also information about an archer named Robert Sadler, who managed 
to earn a considerable sum from ransoms,144 most of those captures were probably made in the name 
of a noble under whose command the archers served or probably sold to members of nobility. In the 
end probably no noble person would have liked to give his oath to a commoner, because in theory it 
was still a honourable contract.145 So if anything else a noble would probably had felt ashamed and 
dishonoured when surrendering to a commoner.
3.2. Oaths of Surrender and the Role of Knight's Word
In the exemplary chapter gives among other thing the description of the act of capture and 
with it the notes how both knights captured by Oudart de Renty and Jean de Helennes are giving 
oaths that they are going to be their captors prisoners, similarly is Jean II described giving one to his 
captor Denys de Morbeque, and in case of Eustace d'Aubrecicourt a note that the chronicler doesn't  
know if an oath was taken. This common element is something that was a common part of chivalric 
warfare. An oath of surrender was the primary way how a knight or squire surrendered to his captor  
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and how began his contract as a prisoner.146 Oaths themselves played a high role in chivalric culture, 
has Keen has stated, most contracts between nobles were based on honour and as such a knights 
honour and reputation were the primary way to enforce the fulfilment of contracts.147 As seen when 
discussing loyalty and treason, the breaking of a solemn vow could have been seen as a treason. 
Oaths themselves carried considerable role in matters of chivalric honour, often being shown as 
great promises given in presence of other members of knighthood. This element might sometimes 
seem as something romantic, indeed we can't confirm how many such oaths were actually made and 
how  much  might  be  chronicler's  and  biographer's  creations.  Froissart  describes  James  Audley 
asking The Black Prince to leave his side to engage the French because of an earlier oath he had 
taken, to be foremost in battle and the most valiant knight on the battlefield.148 Mentions of others 
exist,  perhaps  one  of  the  more  interesting  one  coming  from an negotiation  between  Henry of 
Lancaster and Bertrand du Guesclin, where the first was allowed safe passage through the fortress 
the latter was defending, so he could place his flag on the battlements, because having given such 
oath earlier, being only after doing so able to retreat with honour.149
 
Returning to cases of capture, there is only a description of a very simple oath. That is no 
shortening or simplification of Froissart's part. The initial oath, the one that was taken on battlefield 
after  demanding  from  or  accepting  the  surrender  of  an  defeated  man-at-arms  was  the  simple 
statement that the surrendering person will be the captor's prisoner, only after the battle a more 
thorough contract was made and additional oaths taken from the imprisoned knight.150 Typically 
there were obligations that the captor himself had to take towards his prisoner, most usual being the 
fact that he may have needed to take care or protect his new non-combatant prisoner. In case of the 
count of Dammartin surrendering to a English squire named John Trailly it has been seen that he is 
asking for  them to  protect  or  keep his  safe.  But  the squire  left  and the count  was left  on the 
battlefield, where he was captured again by a Gascon and left again, despite the man’s plea to be 
defended, only the third captor took him to his commander the earl of Salisbury, who captured  him 
and took him under his protection.151 After the battle the issue who is going to be the Count's master, 
although in usual cases the initial captor, John Trailly would have had the right, but because he had 
abandoned the count of Dammartin on the field, it was decided that because of offering the prisoner 
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protection, earl of Salisbury gained the rights to the prisoner.152 This view of obligations on the 
captor's or master's side can be seen very well in the description of Maurice de Berkeley's, where 
taking care of a chivalric prisoner is shown in a pretty idealized form and perhaps in King Jean II 
case, where Denys de Morbeque is in addition to capturing the king, agreeing to take him to the 
Black Prince.153
Both descriptions of captures in the exemplary chapter carry another important element: 
Both the unnamed English knight and Maurice de Berkeley are shown swearing or agreeing that 
they will be their captor's prisoners, rescued or not.154 This element seems to be a strange one, who 
would want to be still considered a prisoner after being freed, but this, alongside a demand that the 
prisoner would not arm himself against his master or his party, on the duration of his captivity or 
until he has obligations towards him.155 Certainly a successful captor wanted to make it certain that 
the prisoner would be under his obligations and unable to act against him. There is a certain element 
that shows up in the words rescued or not, stating an element that the obligations or status as a 
prisoner's didn't necessary end with being released from captivity. Marshal d'Audreham might be an 
example of this, after being captured in Poitiers he had to swear that he will take no arms against  
Edward III or The Black Prince, unless fighting under French royalty.156 Such ruling probably also 
served a part in cases where prisoners were allowed periods of parole to leave captivity and gather 
their ransoms.157
As  stated,  honour  was  the  keystone  of  such  matters  and  breaking  them  could  bring 
dishonour, an act connected to the latter often called just  deshonorement was an act of publicly 
denoting a defaulting noble for his wrongful actions by displaying his arms reversed in public.158 
Typically an agreement for such an agreement from a ruler was needed, because only he would 
have had the right to confer public honour. Such action could was cheaper and less risky than trying 
to gain reprisal through attacking and raiding the defaulting prisoner's lands and strongly effective 
by directly attacking his reputation. Such action being effective is shown also in what risks it could 
bring.  After  the  captain  of  Montcountour  had  decided to  use  this  method  against  Bertrand du 
Guesclin,  who he believed had broken his  obligations  as  a  prisoner  after  Najera,  Du Guesclin 
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attacked the castle and hung the captain from the walls,159 making a rather strong argument about 
how members of knighthood could have felt about their honour being tarnished and showing how 
much strength could the act of such public shaming carry.
3.3. Escape, Rescue and Possible Oath-breaking
There may be some question about the case of Eustace d'Aubrecicourt's temporary capture 
to be Froissart actually mentioning the problems of rashness in knighthood, but something else 
comes also up there, especially when talking about ransom contracts ad oaths included to them. 
Namely the fact that Froissart has felt the necessity to state at his capture that he does not know if  
an oath was taken from him.160 As seen earlier,  the oath of surrender  was the primary way of 
beginning and making a ransom contract. So what is trying Froissart say, is he trying to state that 
the German men-at-arms who captured Eustace d'Aubrecicourt did it somehow illegally or is he 
justifying the knights continued fighting after the rescue? It might be weird to think that a case of 
rescue being somehow illegal, yet as shown in descriptions of oaths and contracts it could become, 
the  question  is  rather,  did  anyone  care  or  how  it  was  justified,  be  it  by  chivalric  culture  or 
chronicler's in general.
Why did Froissart need necessary to state the fact that he does not know if an oath was taken 
from the captured knight? It has been thought that Froissart had decent knowledge of law of arms 
and could just bring up justification or reasoning why one or other “heroic example” in his writings  
acted like he did, with no loss of honour.161 Can it  be seen as a attempt to dispel any possible 
thought about the knight defaulting his obligations as a prisoner? Could there have happened even 
this question, since there is a possibility that his captor might have been killed when the German 
group was attacked, among them earl of Nassau, to who the men-at-arms had been attached to 
whose position they had tied him to a cart.162 At some level it could be argued that the fact that he 
was just left there could be seen as the captors breaking their obligations by not taking care or 
defending him. Yet as the case of Dammartin shows, such things came up, prisoners could have 
been taken and left on the battlefield, sometimes helpless and being captured by several different 
persons.163 On the other hand would there been a oath taken, Eustace d'Aubrecicourt would have 
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been under an obligation to not participate in combat or at least would have had the need to pay for  
sparing his life. But would it have been actually mattered?
Considering  the  role  of  oaths  in  chivalric  honour  and  the  fact  that  a  nobles  word  and 
reputation were the primary thing enforcing the ransom contracts a good question can be made. 
Would every rescue attempt be an illegal attempt and also escaping from captivity. As described 
above, ransom contracts could demand from prisoners that they don't attempt to aid their rescuers. 
This  leads  to  a  moment that  seems same with retreating,  the  fact  that  the chivalric  ideals  and 
questions of honour clashing with actual warfare. Still since every retreat wasn't an dishonourable 
act of cowardice, so can't perhaps every prisoner who managed to escape heir captivity or accepted.  
There are known some cases where a prisoner decided to honour his agreement. There exists a 
mention of duke of Guelders who while fighting in Prussia (1388) was captured by a squire named 
Conrad. After being rescued by Teutonic knights he insisted that he is still oathbound and would 
have returned to captivity if heis men hadn't brokered for his release.164 In a way the King Jean II 
decision to return to captivity in England, because of one of his sons Louis d'Anjou defaulting on 
his hostage-ship165 can be seen as a similar activity, although  often seen as foolhardy, this decisiont 
have been taken to preserve some peace with England.166 There is very little known of any reproach 
existed escapes or could have been any further obligations demanded. The obligations could in 
theory continue for a long time, as seen in case of d'Audreham, who eleven years after the battle of 
Poitiers was still a subject to his obligations. There exists a note about escaped prisoners that if 
another person managed to capture them, the original master would lose the rights to him and those 
would be transferred to the new captor.167
Froissart gives a longer description of an rescue and a escape, the later, involving Raymond 
d´Marneil being partially touched on discussing aspects of loyalty. The first comes from earlier 
stages of war. The English knights John Boteler and Matthew Trelawney have been shown being 
imprisoned by a French noble named Charles de Blois who is approached by lord Lewis168 of Spain, 
who is interested in acquiring them both with the plan of executing them  both. The lord reluctantly 
hands them over to his ally, with a statement of him making an bad decision by executing both men. 
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But the English managed to learn of the event and decide to free them in a daring assault to the  
encampment where both men were held,  successfully retrieving both.169 Certainly another great 
deed to Froissart to write and a great act of honour to the rescuers. But was any reproach to the 
honour of those they rescued? It can't be expected that they would have accepted probable torture 
and execution just on the basis of preserving their honour. In the case of escape, it was mentioned 
above  that Raymond d'Marneil managed to get the help of a unnamed Englishman to help him for 
payment out of captivity, before being handed over to Edward III, who planned to execute for his 
earlier  treason.  Where  despite  the  situation  the  description  turns  more  into  an  account  of  a 
honourable adventure, than of two men who have betrayed their liege.170 The unifying theme in both 
descriptions  is  the fact  that  the prisoners were to be executed.  Threat of death was one of the 
primary things that  could end prisoners obligations,  since the moment where the captor  agreed 
accept a surrender was the moment where he chose to spare his life.171
This leads to some other questions.  Could any prisoner obligation be just  voided on the 
clause  that  prisoner's  life  came  under  a  threat  and  as  such,  any such  contract  was  essentially 
meaningless. There were enough cases where noble prisoners could lose their lives, already the 
vengefulness of Lewis of Spain being seen as a indicator. Froissart touches also on the execution of 
prisoners and reactions to it in several places, most apparent being the case of Derval in 1373, 
where  both  besiegers  and  defenders  executed  their  hostages.172 When  looking  at  cases  outside 
Froissart's chronicle then the most known and discussed case comes from Agincourt, where Henry 
V ordered the execution of a large number of French prisoners.173 There is a moment in Poitiers 
where the Black Prince is shown encountering the castellan of Amposta and wanting to execute him 
to send a message to cardinal de Perigord who he thought that had broken his trust and despite 
attempting to negotiate a truce had sent his knights to join the French (from who some had actually 
joined French forces on their own volition. Only John Chandos's words spared the castellan on the 
moment, suggesting that the prince should first meet the cardinal and speak with him that he would 
not waste time in battle or possibly sully his honour.174 So the guarantee that surrender would be 
sparing of ones life, not just a stay of execution demanded on a situation and possibly captor (and 
his superiors). This actually illustrates highly how much reputation and connections could help a 
knight, as seen in the case of Caen where French knights were willing to surrender to Thomas  
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Holland they knew from crusading in  Prussia  and Granada.175 But  in  other  cases,  had  Eustace 
d'Aubrecicourt  any guarantee  that  he  wouldn't  be  killed?  Could  at  some  level  stated  that  any 
surrender could be voided just because of the fact that death was an ever present possibility? It can 
be guessed that without any specific reasons the interest  of profit  probably kept most chivalric 
prisoners safe. And most captors probably preferred to avoid any harm to their reputations that 
killing their prisoners could cause.
Decision to execute a prisoner ways a considerable break of faith, he had given his freedom 
to his life to be spared. There were two primary reasons that allowed a prisoner to be executed: The 
prisoner being guilty of treason against captor or the latter's lord or there existing a considerable  
public weal against the prisoner.176 Raymond d'Marneil falls certainly under first category, as does 
Aimery d'Pavia who Charny might have executed for similar reasons, although his reaons might 
have been more personal. The second is probably seen more in case of Vauflart de la Croix who 
Philippe VI had sent to the people of Lisle, who executed him for harm he had caused them. 177 
Froissart seems to be quite against members of knighthood being executed, at least without good 
reason and being in some versions of his chronicles considerably vocal about events in Derval, 
perhaps on reasons that the capture may have been illegitimate.178 There are two problems or issues 
executing prisoners could cause. First being the fact that executing prisoners or not showing mercy 
on battlefield could have affected knight's reputation making it harder to take any prisoner's, since 
the latter would have had a reason to believe their lives being in danger when capturing to him.179 
Second problem was the possible backlash to executions, this was something that perhaps affected 
more  commanders  and  rulers  than  an  “average  man-at-arms.”  Like  again  as  seen  in  Derval, 
although  in  a  more  direct  manner,  the  failed  negotiations  did  lead  both  sides  to  execute  their 
prisoners, the attackers starting with the threat and the defender answering on his side. 180 These 
views are reflected in other cases: after Philippe VI had executed a considerable number of captured 
Breton nobility, Edward III planned to execute Herve du Leon, a French knight captured earlier as 
an act of vengeance. Only thanks to the earl of Derby's intervention he is spared and released, but  
stills to serve as counterpoint to the executions, by showing that the English king treated honourable 
prisoners better than the his French counterpart.181
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How did the knighthood themselves think of the chance of executing their prisoners? The 
loss of profit could be unfortunate, loss in reputation could have been possible. Some historians, 
like Keegan have argued that when Henry V give his order to execute French prisoners, then he had 
to order around 200 archers to do it, because his knights didn't want to, both on reasons of lost profit 
and unwillingness to kill surrendered members of knighthood.182 Certainly there is difference of not 
deciding to kill someone in a fight, than a bound person, especially another noble. Certainly there 
could have been reasons to execute another. Still it has been observed that there is no practically 
bare mention by chroniclers  of  this  being  horrible  event,  especially since these prisoners  were 
bound and away from the front line. Although Monstrelet or some others might have been quiet 
because of their connections, although the relative silence of other chroniclers is strange, hinting 
that perhaps most of contemporaries might have accepted the king's action perhaps regrettable but 
necessary.183 Some chroniclers have made note of the English victory being still uncertain at that 
moment and as such have described the possibility of the deed being necessary to protect their rear 
in case if prisoners are freed and rearmed. Some of the chroniclers blaming the French attack on the 
supply train.184 Monstrelet makes a comment of two French knights getting too close with their men 
and being later punished for probably causing the executions185 In general it seems that executing 
noble  prisoners  could  have  been  considered  necessary,  for  different  reasons,  but  not  used 
commonly.
3.4. Loyalty and Treason: the Questions of Oath and Allegiance
Loyalty has a weird place among chivalric ideals and matters of honour, some historians 
have tried to draw a connection between loyalty and prowess, showing the first as a way to guide  
the other.186 Although strongly connected with allegiance and being truthful, keeping ones word and 
general trustworthiness fall under the tenets of loyaute. But the previous observation have touched it 
enough, in the end a lot more can be seen in acts of disloyalty and treason. A knights word and oath  
carried considerable strength and although the above-mentioned cases about escape and rescue say 
a few words about it then a more general breaking of oaths and allegiances should be discussed.
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Froissart describes a case where some ambiguity in the matters of loyalty seems to come up 
in a very strong way and involves one of most respected knights of his time. Perhaps the warning 
that Geoffroi de Charny gives about “those who are too ingenious and overtly subtle,” where he 
talks about subtlety leading a man-at-arms astray, talks about his own experiences when organising 
the attack of Calais.187 Since besieging the castle would have been too hard, Charny attempted to 
use subterfuge in taking the city, by bribing its Lombardian commandant Aimery de Pavia to open 
the gates to him. Unknowingly to the French knight,  Edward III learned of the plot and called  
Aimery188 to England, where the latter  saved himself  by admitting the plot and stating that his 
treason isn't final yet, because he hadn't received the payment yet. The king commanded him to 
pretend that everything was the same and started planning a trap to the French.189 There is some 
difference of this story in Le Baker's chronicle where Aimery is shown immediately informing the 
king of the plot.190 In both cases the end result is the same, the French fell into the trap set by 
Edward  III  and  in  the  following  fight  a  number  of  them  were  captured,  among  them  the 
commanders Charny and Eustace d'Ribeaumont.191 Despite attempting to take the city in such way, 
there seems to be no harm to Charny's  reputation,  neither  were he or any other  French knight 
punished in harsher way then being held for ransom, hinting that Edward III didn't saw anything 
worse than a attack on Calais in the attempt.192 Of course chivalry accepted usage of subterfuge, 
ruse de guerre and any other clever tactics as a normal part of warfare,193 but an attempt to bribe a 
high official to betray his king should at least show Charny in some bad light, but there seems to be 
none, even Edward III's words to the knight might be more about him just about attempting to take 
the  city  and  failing  in  doing  that.194 Would  there  actually  been  any  reproach  to  Charny  for 
attempting to bribe Aimery to betraying his king? Although moral questions can be made, in matters 
of allegiance the knight was doing nothing wring in an attempt to bribe an enemy to betray his 
sworn oath.
The story between Aimery and Charny doesn't end with Calais. After Charny returned from 
captivity hea fte some time found the new posting of Aimery in a castle named Fentun, somewhere 
near Calais.195 Its unknown if Aimery was relocated because of the bribe or did the king just find a 
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somebody better to his position.196 Charny was true to the words he later wrote into his  Livre de  
chevaliere, where he calls men-at-arms to be vengeful towards their enemies.197 He attacked the 
castle and captured Aimery. Because there was a truce at that pint, he felt the castle untouched, 
making it clear that it was a private matter and returned to St. Omer where he executed his prisoner 
for treason and with great cruelty.198 If the knight had a reason for taking vengeance he clearly had it 
now, but something interesting must be noted in that case. The capture being a private case, how 
could Aimery have been executed for a treason. At some cases oath-breaking and with that breaking 
of certain obligations could have been seen as a treason, although not all of them made a person a 
traitor. As seen in the case of Arnoul d'Audrehem this possibility was very real. D'Audrehem had 
been captured in the battle of Poitiers and his ransom contract included the standard not taking arms 
against  against  his  master,  in  this  case  Edward III  or  his  heir  The Black Prince,  except  when 
fighting under the flag of French royalty. After being captured in the battle of Najera, the Black 
Prince accused him of treason, because of breaking that obligation by fighting under Enrique de 
Trasmara.  D'Audrehem defended his actions with a simple statement that he hadn't  broken any 
obligations, because he was fighting against Don Pedro a claimant of the throne of Castile, whose 
service The Black Prince as joined as knight Edward Plantagenet, but not as the heir of English 
crown. I any case this statement had freed him from the accusation.199 As discussed a breaking of a 
solemn vow or a ransom contract could have been defined as an act of treason, and indeed in case of 
d'Audrehem, Keen observes that there might indeed have existed a possibility that the knight may 
have been executed if found guilty.200 
Keen has noted that the questions of allegiance are perhaps the most complicated in the 
medieval laws of war, among them existing many different bonds, allegiances, oats and contracts 
that could have affected on whose side a man would have gone to fight201, when looking at the 
previously described case of predicament where d'Audrehem found himself, but on the same way 
how he saved himself from the headsman’s block. The question of allegiances and bonds is a long 
and difficult one. From the cases observed in this paper, perhaps only Raymond d'Marneil comes 
closest to a case of actual treason. His and his uncle Louis de Maleval's decision to switch their  
sides from English to the French is described by Froissart as unfortunate event and that both lords  
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started a disastrous war from their castles and Edward III was greatly angered by this action.202 This 
was treason, clear and clear, changing their allegiances on their own will and starting to wage war 
against them. Being guilty of that level treason was something that even routiers tried to avoid, even 
the notorious Arnoul de Creole, more known as the Archpriest declined fighting in the battle of 
Cocherel against Navarrese forces, because of holding lands that belonged to Captal de Buch, one 
of the leaders in the opposing army.203 D'Marneil almost found how a traitors punishment feels 
when he was captured and would have been given over to vengeful Edward III, only to be saved by 
a poor Englishman who took pity for him, who helped him scape. Froissart states nothing more 
about him being a traitor or the Mysterious Englishman, only that it was a great adventure to them 
and the latter was greatly honoured and humble, by taking a lot smaller payment than promised.204 
Does the chronicler turn this to another great exemplary adventure, silently stating that shifts I the 
allegiances are normal?
3.5. Largesse and Honour
Returning to the exemplary chapter and the considerably lengthier description of the capture 
and captivity of Maurice de Berkeley, it can be seen that he was probably a lucky prisoner, with his 
captor being courteous and kind to him, as discussed when talking about honour and capture, true 
chivalric mercy was pragmatic and practical, of course would a rich prisoner treated well,  such 
practice was usual as an attempt to get a rich and/or important prisoner to be thankful and as such 
pay a greater ransom.205 Perhaps less about goading better ransom but offering courtesy to a highly 
important and high ranking prisoner can be seen in descriptions of Jean II's  captivity,  although 
under guard he had the chance to hunt, observe tournaments and was still living as a high member 
of nobility, although being a prisoner of another sovereign.206 Treatment of prisoners can tell a few 
things about chivalry, but specific cases of captivity open a window to a world of chivalric sense of 
honour and reputation that existed outside the world of deeds-in-arms but were on the same time 
enabled by them. Those two cases aren't  in any way common or generic,  both them involving 
members of royalty, commanders and high nobility. The feasts to celebrate English victory after the 
French had failed to retake Calais or the battle of Poitiers. Both describe parts of chivalry that were 
important for a knight to uphold, gain and even use his honour and could have been especially 
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useful to a king or prince wishing to be seen chivalrous.
What were those feasts discussed here and what can be learned from them. As they are 
linked to  English victories,  they are  also linked to  captivities  of  important  French knights  and 
nobles. The events in Calais touch several aspects of chivalric honour, but its important to note the 
events that happened there. After the battle, the captured French knights and commanders were 
given new outfits and brought to a great feast held by Edward III. The king's and his heirs presence 
or earlier participation being a surprise to the French.207 After the feast is ended the king is described 
conversing  both  with  French  and  English  knights  with  two  opposite  treatments  offered  to  the 
commanders  of  the  French force:  Eustace  d'Ribeumont  and Geoffroi  de  Charny.  The first  was 
celebrated as one of the most honourable knights present, gifted a chaplet or string of pearls that 
Edward III had worn during the feast and allowed to leave next day, without needing to pay any 
ransom.208 His attitude towards the organizer of the plot and attack to retake Calais, Geoffroi de 
Charny received considerably different words from him, that are discussed under matters of loyalty 
and treason. This event is often been viewed as a clever political trick by Edward III to win support  
among French nobility.209 Black Prince, who was present on the event probably learned a trick or 
two from his father, because after the battle of Poitiers he is shown acting in even more magnificent  
way towards Jean II and other high ranking French nobles who were captured in the battle. Froissart 
describes the latter being seated on a separate table and being humbly served by the victorious 
Black Prince, who declines offers to join the table by stating that he is not honourable enough.210 In 
a way this description actually feels even a bit overblown, something just even feeling to much or 
too Arthurian in it. There is power of course in such zest and certainly it could have won attention 
among nobility. Some doubt of this event happening can be made on the clause that the mention of 
this  behaviour  is  missing  from the  Chandos Heralds  Life  of  The Black Prince,  where  exists  a 
mention of the Price showing his respect towards the fallen by spending the night among them, but 
there is no other mention besides having a dinner with the captured king.211 Although there may 
have been a supper where all the prisoners ere present, or at least the more important ones, the 
Prince's actions can be thought a description used by le Bel and Froissart to lessen the impact of one 
of the French military disasters.212
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As stated, both event's aren't average cases, but this makes them an even better window to 
the more glamorous aspects of chivalry. One knightly virtue that was seen almost as important as 
prowess was largesse or generosity. In a way it seems weird, considering how much knighthood was 
about success in combat and had no qualms about harming non-combatants, generosity might seem 
something more out of romance, but in fact it was something that was expected among nobility. As 
much a knight needed to have wealth, he also needed to be able to share it.213 Some chivalric writers 
even went so far to describe it as the mother of all virtues.214 Charny a practising knight makes note 
of that necessity, when again talking about how to be a worthy man-at-arms is also describing the 
need to be generous in a form to support others of their path of becoming worthy.215 There is of 
course a important fact to consider when discussing knightly generosity, namely that it was the way 
how members  of  knighthood  tried  to  separate  themselves  from the  rising  merchant-class.  This 
separation  was emphasized  by showing generosity and liberal  living  an quality of  nobility,  by 
having them to share the wealth they either had from their nobility or gained through deeds of 
prowess,  while  bourgeois  were  being  shown  to  be  avaricious  and  greedily  hoarding  coins.216 
Although generosity seems to have had his place something important in Charny's definition of it  
must  be  considered,  namely  the  fact  that  he  encourages  to  support  other  nobles.  Considering 
chivalry, how much did this generous act extend to common folk, probably not very much, at least 
not in the way such kindness was shown towards other members of knighthood.
Eustace d'Ribeaumont is probably one of the best examples of gift-giving among nobles and 
perhaps in ways how chivalry and politics could have been used in general. Gift-giving was no 
simple  act  of  kindness  among  medieval  nobility,  but  a  way  of  showing  both  gift-givers  and 
recipients honour. Between equals it served as a mark of friendship and trustworthiness, showing 
that both of them were honourable and cared for their obligations. Gifts between men of different 
status allowed the socially superior to show the receiving person as worthy of friendship and favour. 
By such honouring of a man of lesser rank he would in end show himself as a man of generosity 
and worth.217 This gift marked d'Ribeaumont as the most honourable and worthy of the French 
knights who had participated in the fight while enhancing the reputation of Edward III among both 
the English and French nobility, making this gesture also a powerful political move. The English 
king was skilled in using chivalry as a political tool to enhance the prestige of the English court.218 
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So the gesture to the knights present can be easily seen as an attempt to sway French knights in 
general to support his claim of the French throne. Edward III image as a chivalric king may have 
had some success, especially considering that there had been some doubts among French nobility 
about Philippe VI succession to the throne,  that was only enforced by his failures at  war with  
England.219 This  political  power  of  gifts  was  considerable,  they  created  connections  between 
members of nobility that could sometimes be seen even as dangerous. Because of that The Black 
Prince commanded Captal The Buch to return all gifts he had gained from Charles V.220 Didn't he 
want the Navarrese commander have any links or any gratitude towards the French king? In any 
case this connection created by gift-giving might have had some implications in chivalic mind,that 
could have worried The Black Prince. What might have Philippe VI and Jean II thought about the 
chaplet of string of pearls given to d'Ribeaumont?
Of course the gift  given to d'Ribeaumont was the “grand finish” of this  political  move, 
because  the  whole  feast  probably  served  the  purpose  of  the  kings  chivalric  politics.  Feats 
themselves were often a way to members of royalty to show the might and splendour of their courts 
of households, lavish entertainments like feasts and tournaments were meant to show a prince to be 
following the high values of chivalry, although in a larger scale than a simple show of largesse.221 
This leads to Black Princes supposed actions in the supper after battle of Poitiers, especially the 
table of honour. Although the Arthurian roots in the form of reflecting the legendary round table can 
be seen, there was actually a table of honour that was contemporary to the time Froissart started 
writing his chronicle and could have been known even participated by some knights described in his 
chronicles.  Die  Ehrentisch222 was  a  tradition  in  the  Teutonic  Order  to  honour  the  best  foreign 
knights in their fights against the pagans. Created to offer some incentive to English and French 
knights to participate in Prussian and Lithuanian crusades. Places on the Ehrentisch were deserved 
for twelve best knights who had proven themselves in combat. When the “Reise” was ending, a 
great feast was held to celebrate it. A small number of knights, usually ten or twelve were chosen by 
heralds and seated on the special “table of honour.” At least on one occasion gifting of of special 
shoulder badges is described, with golden letters  Honneur vaine dout! engraved on them. In any 
case being invited to the table was considered a great honour.223 Is the chronicler using knowledge 
of such event to note the great honour of one or both participants or the prince being inspired by the 
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Ehrentisch or just Arthurian ideas224 is not know. Froissart ends his description with a speech by the 
prince after there are murmurings of his great honour and hos much greater knight and ruler he 
might become.225 In the end magnanimity and generosity were just another tools in a princes or 
knights toolbox. Necessary for him to feel honourable and seem to others. They became far more 
useful in hands of princes and kings who could use them for political ends. Just in the chronicles 
texts this description might have served as a way of showing the chivalrousness of both royals, by 
firsts grandiose act of largesse and in others case as a mark that despite his loss, his and others great 
deeds have at least gained to them respect and admiration to their enemies, making them despite  
having been on a lost side of the battle still honourable.
3.6 Ransoming, Chivalry and Greed
When ending the description of  Jean  de  Helennes'  successful  fight  and  capture,  Froissart 
makes the note of how the young squire managed to get enough ransom to be knighted. Certainly 
this  makes  an  excellent  point  how  much  a  successful  man-at-arms  could  have  earned  from 
ransoming a rich prisoner. As discussed above, the primary reason for “knightly mercy” was the 
profit that could have been gained from the ransom, fortunes were made and lost through such 
actions.
The capture of King Jean II opens a view to the problems of ransoming and perhaps some 
other problematic moments it chivalric honour in general. After Denys de Morbeque managed to 
capture the king, Froissart describes around ten knights and squires also attempting to claim the 
king and his son and the situation becoming more and more dangerous with squabbles and fights 
beginning among the fights.226 A capture of a king and the gain in both renown and profit was 
enormous. Although its hard to believe that any of the knights and squires could have attempted to 
claim the King's ransom for themselves, most important prisoners were bought by Edward III to be 
used in political matters,227 but the gains were still enough to serve a  noble well. This case can in 
some ways be compared to the capture of David II, the king of Scotland who was captured in the 
battle of Neville's Cross in 1346. The king’s captor a knight named John Copeland took the king as 
soon he could from the battlefield and retreated to a fortified location, where he stayed with his men 
224 Die Ehrentissch itself was inspired from Arthurian myths and the round table.
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and the imprisoned king, not willing to hand him over to anyone but Edward III.228 There are some 
considerable similarities in those cases, namely how captors and possible captors acted around a 
captured member of royalty. It can be argued that Copeland took his prisoner as far from battle and 
declined to meet anyone except a member of English royalty to avoid the king being rescued by his 
subjects, but when looking at case of Jean II the decision to avoid losing the prisoner to another 
knight could have been a possibility. Such things happened occasionally count of Dammartin being 
one among other cases where existed several claimants to one prisoner and there existing others. In 
any case, every captor had be ready to protect his claim on a captured noble.229 In this light the 
action taken by Copeland was logical in both keeping the king away from possible rescuers, but 
also from anyone else who could have attempted to take the king.  He was successful and was 
granted  a  considerable  yearly sum that  Edward III  was possibly still  paying in  1356.230 When 
talking  about  the  capture  of  king  Jean,  then  most  sources  seem to  be  agreeing  that  Denys  de 
Morbeque was the king's captor,  Froissart  shows that the argument between him and a Gascon 
named Bernard de Trouttes lasted long after the battle going so far that the Black Prince had to 
arrest both men and put the matter on hold until reaching his father.231
  This leads perhaps to one of the paradoxes of chivalry in the medieval  views of life.  
Although expected to share his wealth, nobility had great expenditures outside the largesse, namely 
the cost of war. Prowess could have brought in wealth and as such enabled the knight to live like a 
noble and practice largesse,  but to get it  all  the knight needed to gain the money for it. 232 The 
process of knighting and The primary way of getting it was of course plunder and ransoms. As seen 
above, chivalric culture had no qualms of gaining wealth in this way, in fact it served as a proof of 
his prowess and honour. A man-at-arms who returned from war laden with loot and either prisoners 
or ransoms gained from them, was a person worthy of recognition.233 Orderic compressed such 
views into a little statement that called ransom money  honorifice, describing it as wealth gained 
through honourable deeds.234  Over time the practice gained critics such as the author of Tree of 
Battles,  Honore Bouvet,  who attacked both ransoming and the way how chivalric  warfare was 
fought generally, joining the ranks of those who wanted to see mercy between Christian soldiers 
being the primary reason for ransoming, and also limiting the sums that could be demanded.235
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There are some interesting words given by Black Prince during his “Arthurian” supper to 
Jean II. Among many good wishes he also talks of hope that his ransom will be so reasonable, that 
he and his father will be friends afterwards.236 Like most ransoms it wasn't, becoming a considerable 
monetary burden for France, in this case a monetary sum of 3,000,000  ecus  over six years, with 
600,000 paid immediately at 1360 when Treaty with England was made.237 A grandiose sum fitting 
a king and perhaps another mark of what ransoming could bring to a victorious captor and harm that 
it  could  cause  to  the  prisoner,  his  lands  and  his  wealth.  Promises  of  reasonable  ransoms  are 
occasionally shown by other  chroniclers  too,  Walsingham in  his  Chronica  Majora  for  example 
mentions negotiations with duke of Alencon, to who a reasonable ransom is offered if he is willing 
to surrender.238
Can there be a monetary price for life. Its clear that chivalric culture thought so. There were 
practices that show the reasonable or true ransom being a one that wouldn't ruin a noble, a typical 
suggested sum being seen equal to one years revenue from the prisoners lands, but in truth, mots of 
the time the ransom demands were higher than that and could easily ruin the prisoners fortunes.239 
Even worse, as possibly seen in the case of Raoul II de Brienne, count of Eu and constable of  
France the masters of prisoners could demand political favours or even treason for a lessened sum 
of  ransom  or  instead  it.240 The  constable's  sudden  execution  after  returning  from captivity  in 
England,241 might have been caused by fact that he had promised to support the claim of Edward III 
on French throne or promised to give him his lands near Calais and a castle with strategical value in 
Guines.242
If chivalry can be defined by its honourable treatment of noble prisoners and disregard for 
non-noble ones,  then the greed for ransom money could change even that.  Of course rich and 
influential prisoners such as Maurice de Berkeley or King Jean II were usually treated well and 
honourably, often with the idea to get them pay a rich ransom.243 There are moments in later books o 
Froissart's  chronicle  mentions  how English  treat  their  captives  well,  contrasting  them with  the 
practice of Germans who treat their captives badly and attempt to extract even the smallest amount 
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of  money  from  their  prisoners.244 This  contrast  is  interesting  because  as  seen,  the  ransoms 
themselves were usually already too high, and neither was mistreating a prisoner seen a despicable 
act.  Mistreating a prisoner was seen an acceptable way to persuade him to accept and pay his 
ransom, it could be just keeping him in chains and in a dark cell, but it could involve torture as 
well.245 In the end until  the captivity didn’t  become too unhealthy and dangerous or the master 
wasn't  planning  on  executing  his  captive,  then  a  lot  was  allowed.246 Torture  and  mistreatment 
perhaps to a limit  where they couldn’t  be considered life threatening. In the end, in matters of 
ransoms,  the  knights  become  as  avaricious  and  greedy  as  he  merchants  they  were  being 
differentiated in chivalric narratives.
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4. Conclusion
There are certain possibilities and limitations when discussing the matters or concept of 
honour and dishonour through cases of capture and captivity. Honour played a considerable role in 
chivalric  culture,  being  the  primary  thing  besides  wealth  or  heritage  the  knight  needed  to  be 
respected.  Shame or dishonour was a powerful thing in chivalric mind. Yet the code of honour 
wasn't what a common modern understanding seems to think what it was. In many aspects chivalry 
was a warrior culture, where both “display of chivalry” but also following the expectations placed 
by chivalric  society and the knight's  peers  had to be followed to gain respect  and recognition. 
Honour was in the end reputation in chivalric culture. And the following things can be stated about 
the nature, gains, losses and used of that reputation. 
Considering that chivalric culture was essentially a warrior aristocracy then it seems to be no 
surprise that skill with weaponry and success were held in highest regard. In some way such matters 
are easy to be discussed though descriptions of capturing combatants, but on the other hand it also 
places certain limits how much the full extend of chivalric warfare and the knighthoods preferences 
can be seen in them. The high appreciation of skill with weapons is shown in the exemplary chapter, 
but the descriptions in that chapter are perhaps placed into an almost perfect way of fighting, on 
open field and horseback. Descriptions overall carry the importance of prowess, showing that even 
in lost battle capacity in fighting and courage can bring victory even in a lost battle as evidenced in 
the exemplary chapter or in case of Eustace d'Ribeaumont where the latter was released without 
ransom and honoured by Edward III  for his  deeds in  battle.  Also he fact  that  knighthood saw 
nothing wrong in trickery or ruses of war can be reflected in events of war. In general chivalry saw 
success in combat and war as the highest source of honour, perhaps preferring to fight in some ways 
more  than  in  others.  Courage  comes  up as  another  important  ideal  connected  with  honourable 
deeds, but perhaps not in so much direct form, but when linked with prowess as the “enabler” of 
latter and  contrasting the shameful act of cowardice. If there was anything more connected with 
dishonour then it was cowardice that was seen among the worst things a knight could take,  its 
shame so harmful that its enough to end a knight's retreat in battle or taunt him to do perhaps an 
unwise act. The power of cowardice was often contrasted with courage and shown as shameful as 
possible. This was done with the reason of discouraging fear, either though shame or like Froissart's  
descriptions to by attempting to inspire to great deeds. But also when talking about chivalric honour 
and courage, something important can be seen, chivalric culture was aware of dangers that emphasis 
on bravery and search of glory could cause.
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Success in battle could lead to gaining prisoners to ransom, in this the honour and reputation 
become important matters. Prisoner taking itself was a mark of success and could bring honour and 
some link with it can be also drawn into the act of showing mercy. The exemplary chapter and the 
capture of Jean II describe an important part in the act of capturing a chivalric combatant: the oath 
of  surrender.  In  cases  of  exemplary chapter  also  one  of  the  important  obligations  of  chivalric 
prisoner is described, namely the aspect where the prisoner had to swear to be his captor's prisoner 
even if  rescued. A nobleman's  sworn word carried considerable strength and such kind of oath 
served as a starting point for a ransom contract. Honour was the binding agent in contracts between 
nobility, basically turning keeping an contract into a matter of reputation and indeed one of the 
possible ways of reprisal to a defaulting noble could have been a public dishonouring by displaying 
his arms reversed. But in some cases a prisoner could have been treated as a traitor, even execution 
could have been possible. The matters of allegiance were also based on sworn words and oaths of 
fealty.  There the matter of treason could come up the strongest and the matter of execution be 
strongest. Loyalty, especially in the form of being sure to ones word was also a high source of  
honour, but its considerably harder to discuss only on basis of capture cases, especially greater cases 
of disloyalty.
Reputation  and games  around it  come clearly up also in  “peacetime” ways  of  chivalry. 
Largesse in form of gift-giving and feasts was a chance for a noble to show himself honourable, but 
also  honour  others,  gift-giving  between  members  of  nobility  being  essentially  a  “game  of 
reputations.”   The  feats  after  events  in  Calais  and  battle  of  Poitiers  are  grand  cases  of  such 
behaviour, involving English royalty showing their chivalrous nature and their great honour, while 
also honouring select enemies. First an attempt by Edward III to win favour among French nobility, 
the second being perhaps a fictional description how the Black Prince honoured Jean II. Both may 
have been great political moves. Largesse played also another role in chivalric culture, mainly in the 
attempt of differentiating them from the rising ranks of the bourgeois, but in the end was also a way 
for a knight to use his honour for honouring another.
In  the  beginning  the  question  of  was  there  actually  a  thing  that  could  be  defined  as 
dishonour in chivalric culture. Although the sources and effects of honour are rather clear to see, the 
aspects of this question, namely the rigidity and flexibility of honour have shown answered in a 
differing manner. The chivalric code may feel in first glance rigid, but in truth in truth it can be just 
considered “wide,” there existed enough justification and acceptance of things that at first glance 
might seem to go against the chivalric sense of honour, but chivalric sense wasn't certainly that 
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flexible that every shameful or despicable deed would go with any reproach. Rather there were 
ways how some things were seen as not going against knight's oaths or ways they were acceptable. 
Fleeing from battle could have been a shameful and dishonourable act, but there were reasons like 
the battle being fully lost  or another stringer reason existing where leaving the field and one's 
companions could be accepted. Another comes up perhaps in cases of captivity, where there was no 
obligation for a knight to merrily await the headsman’s axe on the basis that his honour didn't allow 
him an attempt of escape, a captor had promised to spare his captives life, and him going against it  
freed the latter from any obligations to him. On the other hand a captor hadn't keep some prisoners 
alive on the basis of having shared his life, traitors and public weal were reasons where captor could 
dismiss  his  own  obligation  to  keep  the  prisoner  alive.  In  the  end  there  existed  a  sense  of 
dishonourable actions, primary among them cowardice and oath breaking or treason, but there were 
always exceptions and ways where such actions could have had less reproach.
In general most of the questions about chivalric honour can be discussed through Froissart's 
descriptions of capture and captivity, although there are matters that are harder to see or just raise 
more questions.  The practice of ransoming could from some corner  seen as  a  form of gaining 
honour because from profit and fame that could be gained from certain prisoners could increase a 
knights honour, but in a way these cases lead seemingly into a form of hypocrisy, there the members 
of knighthood may have started to ignore the aspect of treating noble prisoners well, going from 
simple but acceptable mistreatment to torture. Also the need for rich prisoners cloud very well lead 
to attempts of original captor's rights. Still its hard to build up discussion only around the case of 
Jean II's capture and some hints, in general its seems that with getting the ransom where as little 
qualms as warfare most acts fitting under the precepts of honour although some actions could be 
harmful towards reputation, like execution of prisoners, that could case a wider number of issues. 
The question of dishonour of greed in ransoming and problems caused by it is perhaps something 
that  could  be  discussed  further.  Also  the  connection  between  mercy  and  honour  is  perhaps 
something that came up. In general “chivalric mercy was practical and pragmatic, value of prisoners 
wealth and status more important than being merciful. At a lot of level it could be argued that by 
showing mercy a knight could show itself as a worthy member of knighthood.
The limitations of the subjects made also difficult to discuss some important matters about 
chivalric  culture  and concept  of  honour.  The matters  of  loyalty and treason,  are  among those, 
although Froissart occasionally describes cases of treason and breaking contracts or sworn word in 
his Book I, but its hard to go deeper into the wide word of such cases. The prowess and warfare as a  
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main source of honour and recognition is another thing that despite being a necessary component in 
gaining prisoners  is  again something that  can be seen but  not discussed in  a full  manner.  The 
dishonour because lack of  success in arms or humiliation of defeat are perhaps a possible direction 
of  research  for  discussing  chivalry.  Chivalric  chronicles  tend  to  emphasize  success,  even 
occasionally  defend  the  capacity  of  defeated,  but  what  can  actually  be  told  about  the  matter, 
especially on the matter of defending the reputation of defeated by showing them as courageous and 
honourable or showing them defeated only because overwhelming odds?
In the end there is the matter of the exemplary chapter, throughout this paper those two 
descriptions that create such contrast to the fate of the rest of the French combatants. As stated in 
the introduction, the example how a knight should act and what success in arms can bring seems 
perhaps seems to convenient,  especially how much detail,  that has been used in this  thesis  for 
analysing the matters of knightly culture and its  sense of honour.  Its more of an example than 
Froissart's  writings usually are,  and perhaps that’s  what it  is.  An example of chivalric culture's 
values where courage and prowess bring success over an worthy enemy and through that again in 
honour and profit.
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6.  Resümee:  Rüütlikultuuri  Au  ja  Autus  Froissarti  kroonikates 
leiduvate vangistus- ja vangistamisjuhtumite kirjelduste kontekstis
Rüütel ja rüütellus (või rüütellikkus) on ühed tuntuimad keskajast pärinevad mõisted, mis on 
enamvähem tuttavad igale  ühele  kes  natukenegi  keskajast  teab.  Siiski  see natukene tihti  erineb 
sellest, mis keskaegne rüütlikultuur tegelikult oli, mõistes ehk kauget üldpilti ja mõningaid kilde 
sellest, kuid mitte täielikku pilti. Seda enamjaolt 12-15 sajandi ümbruses eksisteerinud nähtus või 
idee  on  defineeritud  kui  “sõjalise  ülikkonna  kultuuri  mis  nägi  sõjapidamist  kui  oma  pärilikku 
õigust.“ Au oli keskse tähtsusega omadus rüütelkonna seas, keskaegne ülik elas ühiskonnas kus talle 
seati  hulk  erinevaid  sotsiaalseid  norme  ja  eeldusi  mida  ta  pidi  täitma,  et  pälvida  ühejäänud 
rüütelkonna austust, samal ajal vältides häbi ja alandust. Antud uurimustöö üritabki puudutada au ja 
autust puudutavat, käsitleda rüütlikultuuri arusaama läbi Froissart'i kroonikates leiduvate vangistus 
ja vangistamisjuhtumite  kirjelduste.
Jean  Froissart  oli   üks  tuntumaid  keskaegseid  kroonikuid,  kahtlemata  tuntuim,  kes  on 
kirjutanud Saja-aastasest sõjast. Kuigi tema kroonikad annavad pika, põhjaliku ja detailse ülevaate 
sündmustest ja neis osalenud isikutest, kuid tihtipeale ning ka selle uurimuse jaoks pole see selle 
põhiliseks väärtuseks. Froissart'i kroonika on täis ebatäpsusi ja eksitusi, kroonik tunnistab ka ausalt 
oma eesmärki rääkida suurtest tegudest, mida tulevatele põlvedele eeskujuks tuua. Allikakriitilise 
vaatenurga läbi võib teda näha kui tegelike sündmuste osas võrdlemisi ebausaldusväärset allikat, 
oma ürituses  anda edasi  kirjeldusi  mida  tema lugejaskond,  ehk aadelkond,  oleks  tahtnud näha, 
askepteerida  ja  heroiliseks  pidada,  muutub Froissart  väärtuslikuks  aknaks  temaaegse  aadliku  ja 
rüütli  mõtteilma.  Tema põhjalike kirjelduste  seas  on ka arv juhtumeid,  mis  puudutavad rüütlite 
vangistamist  ja  vangis  viibimist,  mis  võimaldavad  omajagu  pilti  rüütlikultuuri  mõningastesse 
aspektidesse.  Teise  üliku  vangistamine  ja  lunaraha  eest  vabaduse  pakkumine  oli  tavaline 
praktiseering  rüütellikus  sõjakunstis,  osad  ajaloolased  nägemas  kõrgest  soost  võitlejate  head 
kohtlemist, samal ajal lihtrahvas east pärinevatest võitlejatest mitte hoolimist, üheks rüütlikultuuri 
põhitunnusteist. Eelnevalt mainitud kirjeldustest on valitud informatiivsemad nende seas on hulk 
erinevaid  juhtumeid  sisaldades  kuningas  Jean  II  vangistamist  Poitiersi  lahingus (1356),  väärika 
vangi kõrget kohtlemist kui ka austasustamist, põgenemisjuhtumeid, ning samuti ka üks omapärane 
peatükk kahe  prantsuse  võitleja  edust,  mis  on isegi  liiga  hea  näide  isegi  Froissarti  „tavapärase 
inspireerivuse“ osas, ning olles üks kasulikemaid tugipunkte teema uurimisel.
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Töö  on  jagatud  kaheks  suuremaks  osaks,  alustades  rüütellikusega  lahinguväljal  ja  teine 
läheb  üle  vähem  sõjalistele  küsimustele,  mis  on  siiski  mõjutatud  esimese  tähtsusest.  Esimene 
peatükk  lahkab kõige  suuremat  au  ja  hiilguse  allikat  rüütlikultuuris  sõda  ja  võitlust,  vaadeldes 
vapruse ja arguse suhet aus ja autuses kui ka esitades küsimuse teemal, kas oli ka võimalust pageda,  
mida  ei  nähtud  häbiväärsena.  Puudutatud  saab  ka  „võimekus“  ehk  rüütli  suutlikkus  sõjas  ja 
võitluses  ning natuke sõjakunsti  üleüldse.  Edu võitluses ja  sõjas  olemas vaadeldud kui  rüütliau 
suurim  allikas.  Lõpetuseks  on  vaadeldud  asjaolu,  et  rüütlikultuur  mõistis  aujahi  ja  hulljulguse 
probleeme.
Teises peatükis on käsitletud vandeid, lepinguid, vangide kohtlemist, suuremeelsust kui ka 
nende mõningaid  võimalikke  probleemseid  kohti.  Esimene puudutab  vangistust  üleüldse,  heites 
pilgu nii sellele teole kui ka kui ka rüütliväärikuse ja halastuse suhtele. Edasised kolm alapeatükki  
puudutavad, midagi mis väga tugevalt toetus rüütliaule, lepinguid ja vandeid, eriti siis vangistamise 
ja vangistusega seonduvaid.  Vaadeldud saab ka küsimus,  kas avastades ausidemeid,  mis sidusid 
vangistajat  ja  vangi  võis  olla  vääritu  ja  vale  pageda  vangistusest.  Käsitlus  langeb  hetkeks  ka 
karmimatele  küsimustele  lepete  ja  vannete  murdmisel,  heites  lühikese  pilgu  lojaalsus  ja 
reetmisküsimistele,  keskendudes  pigem  viiamstele,  millest  kirjeldused  selgemalt  räägivad. 
Suuremeelsus viib vaatenurga võib olla kõige vähem sõjakamale asjale kõigist vaadeldud rüütlielu 
osadest, puudutades kinkide tegemist ja suuremeelsust kui viisi näidata oma au kui samas ka selle 
käigus autasustada teisi, visates omamoodi pilgu rüütlipoliitikasse, ning kuidas inglise kuninglikus 
isikud võisid rakendada suuremeelsust ja pidusöömasid kui poliitilisi vahendeid. Lõpus arutletakse 
natuke lunarahade ja rüütelliku ahnuse üle.
Üleüldiselt annab töö põhjaliku ülevaate rüütliaust ja selle eri tahkudest. Väärikus oli oluline 
igale rüütlile, see oli reputatsioon ja hinnang, mis talle anti. Ka vangistusjuhtumid, suure üllatuseta 
tõestavad, et edukus võitluses, nii suutlikkust kui vaprust omades oli kõige austatum. Samas ühtede 
suurimate autuse allikate seas oli argus. Nii argust kui vaprust rõhutati aga lihtsa eesmärgiga, et 
vähendada  hirmu mõju  rüütelkinnas  eas.  Kuid  väärikus  polnud  omandatud  vaid  sõjas,  vaid  ka 
rahuajal  seisusekohase  käitumisega,  mis  omajagu  mängis  rolli  omamoodi  reputatsiooni-  või 
rüütlipoliitikana, kingid aadlisoost isikute vahel olemas väärikuse näide, ning inglise kuningakoja 
liikmed rakendamas seda kui poliitilisi võtteid edu nimel. Rüütliau ise oli tugev asi, põhiline jõud 
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millele toetusid lepingud ja nende murdmine võis tuua kaasa tõsiseid probleeme. Kahtlemata polnud 
rüütliau päris täiesti see, mida tavamõte eeldab seda olevat. Isegi „päris asi“ tundub esmapilgul 
rangemana kui  tundub.  Tegelikult  tuleb  tõdeda selle  arvestatavat  praktilisust  ja  pragmaatilisust, 
niimõnigi esmapilgul autuna näiv asi aktsepteeritav vastavates olukordades. Rüütlikultuuri aumõiste 
või kood polnud ei jäik ega paindlik, vaid piisav et haarata enda alla eri hulka tegureid ja lahendusi 
ning mitte olla kinni väärituna näiva teo taga kui see oleks olnud asjatu või eluohtlik, kuid au ise oli 
sama reaalne mõiste kui rüütlikultuur, jaht selle järgi oluline, kuid see ise ka vajalik tööriist.
7. Appendix
The exemplary chapter
Two Frenchman, running away from the battle, are pursued by two Englishmen, who are 
themselves made prisoner.
Among the battles, skirmishes, flights and pursuits, which happened in the course of this 
day, an adventure befel sir Edward de Roucy,247 which I cannot omit relating in this place. He had 
left the field of battle, as he perceived the day was irrecoverably lost; and, not wishing to fall into 
the hands of the English, was got about a league off; when he was pursued by an English knight, his 
lance in the rest, who cried to him, “Sir knight, turn about: you ought to be ashamed thus to fly.” 
Upon this, sir Edward halted, and the Englishman attacked him, thinking to fix his lance in his 
target; but he failed, for sir Edward turned the stroke aside, nevertheless he did not miss his own: 
with his spear he hit his enemy so violent a blow on the helmet, that he was stunned and fell to the 
ground, where he remained senseless. Sir Edward dismounted, and, placing his lance on his breast, 
told him that he would certainly kill him, if he did not surrender himself his prisoner, rescued or not. 
The Englishman surrendered, and went with sir Edward, who afterward ransomed him. 
It happened that, in the midst of the general pursuit, a squire from Picardy, named John de 
Helennes, had quitted the king’s division, and, meeting his page with a fresh horse, had mounted 
him, and made off as fast as he could. At that time, there was near to him the lord of Berkeley, a 
young knight, who, for the first time, had that day displayed his banner: he immediately set out in  
pursuit of him. When the lord Berkeley had followed him for some little time, John de Helennes 
turned about, put his sword under his arm in the manner of a lance, and thus advanced upon the lord 
Berkeley, who taking his sword by the handle, flourished it, and lifted up his arm in order to strike 
the squire as he passed. John de Helennes, seeing the intended stroke, avoided it, but did not miss 
his own; for as they passed each other, by a blow on the arm he made lord Berkeley’s sword fall to  
the ground. When the knight found that he had lost  his sword, and that the squire had his, he 
dismounted, and made for the place where his sword lay: but he could not get there before the 
squire gave him a violent thrust which passed through both his thighs, so that, not being able to help 
himself, he fell to the ground. John upon this dismounted, and, seizing the sword of the knight,  
247  Johnes has translated the names to anglicised variants. True names should possibly be Oudart de Roucy and Jean 
de Henennes. Froissart on the other hand is mistaken on Maurice de Berkeley's name
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advanced up to him and asked him if he were willing to surrender. The knight required his name: “I  
am called John de Helennes,” said he, “what is your name?” “In truth, companion,” replied the  
knight, “my name is Thomas, and I am lord of Berkeley, a very handsome castle situated on the  
river Severn,  on the borders of Wales.” “Lord of Berkeley,”  said the squire,  “you shall  be my 
prisoner: I will place you in safety, and take care you are healed, for you appear to me to be badly  
wounded.”  The knight answered,  “I surrender myself willingly, for you have loyally conquered  
me.” He gave him his word that he would be his prisoner, rescued or not. John then drew his sword 
out of the knight’s thighs and the wounds remained open; but he bound them up tightly, and, placing 
him on his horse, led him a foot-pace to Châtelherault. He continued there, out of friendship to him, 
for fifteen days, and had medicines administered to him. When the knight was a little recovered, he 
had him placed in a litter, and conducted him safe to his house in Picardy; where he remained more 
than a year before he was quite cured, though he continued lame; and when he departed, he paid for  
his ransom six thousand nobles, so that this squire became a knight by the great profit he got from 
the lord of Berkeley. 
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